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Note
The Future of the Federalism Revolution:
Gonzales v. Raich and the Legacy of the Rehnquist
Court
By Christina E. Coleman*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passing of Chief Justice William Rehnquist,1 some
observers have wondered what will become of the former Chief
Justice's "Federalism Revolution." 2  Chief Justice Rehnquist's Court
restrained Congress's authority to enact federal legislation under the
Commerce Clause for the first time since the New Deal era.3 When the
* J.D. expected May 2007. I am grateful to the members and editorial board of the Loyola
University Chicago Law Journal for their great assistance in completing this article. Special
thanks to Michael Weaver for his valuable advice and perspective. Most of all, I thank my
husband, Malcolm Hawkes, for his support, keen economic insights, and willingness to reflect on
constitutional law issues.
1. Liz Halloran & Angie Cannon, Rehnquist's Death Leaves Second Vacancy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.usnews.comlusnews/newslarticleslO50904/4chiefjustice.htm. The nation's sixteenth
chief justice died of thyroid cancer on September 3, 2005. Id. William Rehnquist was Assistant
U.S. Attorney General when President Nixon appointed him to the Court in 1971; he joined the
Court as an Associate Justice in 1972. Linda Greenhouse, William H. Rehnquist, Architect of
Conservative Court, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A16. In 1986, President Reagan
appointed him Chief Justice. Id.
2. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Will the 'New Federalism' Survive the New Court?, WALL ST. J.,
Op-ed., Sept. 5, 2005, at A28, available at http://www.volokh.com/posts/1126102484.shtm
("[I]t was William Rehnquist who was most personally responsible for what is now called 'the
New Federalism'-the revival of the ideas that judiciary should protect the role of the states
within the federal system and enforce the textual limits on the powers of Congress."); David
Bernstein, Balkin on Originalism, http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_11_06-
2005. ll12.shtml#l 131389614 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) ("[A]m I optimistic that the
'federalism revolution' will be revived? No, at least not until the Republican Party signifies that
it would provide some political support/cover for such a move."); see infra Part ll.B (discussing
Chief Justice Rehnquist's Federalism Revolution).
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (finding the Violence Against
Women Act exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez,
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Court struck down federal legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause, critics heralded a new era of federalism.
4
It appeared to certain commentators that the Court would continue in
this direction in deciding Gonzales v. Raich, in which the Respondents
challenged the constitutionality of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)
in the context of medical marijuana-these observers predicted the
Court would not uphold such an attenuated exercise of the federal
commerce power.5 However, in Raich, the Court held that Congress
had the power to regulate the purely local, noncommercial cultivation
and possession of marijuana for personal medical use.6  Chief Justice
514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act beyond the scope of federal
congressional power because it regulated a noneconomic activity).
4. See L. Darnel Weeden, United States v. Morrison: The Supreme Court's Old School
Federalism Places Federal Civil Rights for Women and Minorities at Risk, 26 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1, 1 (2000-2001) ("Prior to Morrison it was generally believed that Congress could use its
power to regulate commerce to protect the civil rights of American citizens so long as there was a
reasonably demonstrated nexus between the regulated activity and a burden on interstate
commerce."); Gordon G. Young, The Significance of Border Crossings: Lopez, Morrison and the
Fate of Congressional Power to Regulate Goods, and Transactions Connected with Them, Based
on Prior Passage Through Interstate Commerce, 61 MD. L. REV. 177, 183 (2002) ("In its
apparently categorical exclusion of certain activities from Commerce Clause regulation, the
Lopez Court takes a position resembling one taken by the pre-New Deal Court and strongly
repudiated by subsequent Supreme Courts."); Louis J. Virelli Inl & David S. Leibowitz,
Federalism Whether They Want It or Not: The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of
Federal Civil Rights Legislation after United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 949
(2001) ("Despite a clearly established trend of evaluating statutes in terms of whether Congress
acted rationally in finding that the regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the
Lopez Court instead focused on whether the regulated activity was economic in nature or
belonged to an area of law that was traditionally reserved to the states.").
5. Marcia Tiersky, Comment, Medical Marijuana: Putting the Power Where it Belongs, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 547, 593 (1999) (quoting Roger Pilon, Medical Marijuana Hearing of the Crime
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 1997) ("Not even the
notorious case of Wickard v. Filburn will justify federal intervention in this kind of a case.").
See, e.g., Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 946 (2003)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) ("Medical marijuana, when grown locally for personal consumption,
does not have any direct or obvious effect on interstate commerce."); Jonathan H. Adler, High
Court High Anxiety: The Supreme Court's Medical-Marijuana Case Could Send Federalism Up
in Smoke, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2004, http://nationalreview.com (arguing that under
the government's reasoning at oral argument "there is no activity beyond Congress's grasp");
Catherine Laughlin, U.S. Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Ashcroft v. Raich, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 396, 399 (2005) ("[S]ome legal scholars have framed Raich as test of the
Supreme Court's commitment to limiting federal power."). But see Warren Richely, It's
Rehnquist's Court, but the Liberals Are Gaining, USA TODAY, June 30, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.comnews/washington/2005-06-30-csm-liberal-court x.htm?csp=34
(arguing that the supposed states' rights coalition-Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, Kennedy
and O'Connor-was on shaky ground, largely because of the swing votes of Kennedy and
O'Connor (written prior to the departures of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor)).
6. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005). See infra Part II.A (outlining the facts of
Raich). The Court denied an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970, despite California law allowing seriously ill patients the use of marijuana
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Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas vigorously dissented,
insisting that such an extension of the federal commerce power was
unprecedented.7 The majority, including Justices Scalia and Kennedy,
who voted with the Raich dissenters in earlier decisions limiting the
commerce power, maintained that Raich was not analogous to those
prior cases, and found a rational basis for congressional regulation. 8
With this apparent departure from earlier limitations on federal power
set by the Rehnquist Court and the addition of two new Justices, 9 it is
unclear whether Raich marks a shift away from federalism or simply a
trumping of current drug policy over federalist concerns.
10
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, with special focus on the three central cases discussed in
the Raich opinion: United States v. Lopez, United States v. Morrison,
and Wickard v. Filburn.11 In addition, Part II will briefly outline Justice
Rehnquist's efforts to turn the Court toward federalism.12 Part II will
also outline the history of drug regulation in the United States and
describe the main provisions of the CSA and state legislation governing
for therapeutic purposes on the recommendation of a physician. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201. After
federal agents destroyed the marijuana plants of one such medical marijuana user, an injunction
action was brought in federal court, eventually reaching the Supreme Court. Id. at 2200.
7. Raich, 125 S Ct. at 2220-39.
8. Id. at 2200.
9. William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice O'Connor Resigns, WASH. POST. July 1,
2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/07/01/AR2005070100653.html. Justice O'Connor announced her
retirement from the Court effective July 1, 2005. Id. Prior to the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Judge John Roberts was nominated to replace Justice O'Connor; following Chief
Justice Rehnquist's death, he was tapped by President Bush to lead the Court. Richard W.
Stevenson, President Names Roberts as Choice for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at
Al. He was confirmed as Chief Justice on Sept. 29, 2005. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elizabeth
Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief Justice: Democrats Split - Focus Now on
Second Pick, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al. On January 31, 2006, Justice Samuel Alito was
sworn in to replace Justice O'Connor after a Senate vote that sharply divided Democrats and
Republicans. David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn in as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006 at A21.
10. Hendrick Hertzberg, Watched Pot, NEW YORKER, June 27, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/content/articles/050627tatalkhertzberg. Hertzberg argues that
in Gonzales v. Raich "the true agenda of the majority (especially its moderate members) was to
slow the Court's 'federalist' ... drift toward chipping away at the regulatory powers of the
national government, while the minority's purpose was to accelerate that drift." Id.
11. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that intrastate activities of an
individual may not escape regulation under the Commerce Clause if those activities, when taken
in consideration with those of other similarly situated actors, have an effect on interstate
commerce); supra note 3 (briefly describing Lopez and Morrison). See infra Part II.A (reviewing
the history of federal commerce power interpretations).
12. See infra Part II.B (detailing Justice Rehnquist's Federalism Revolution and the landmark
cases United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison).
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medical marijuana use. 13  Part III then will discuss the majority,
concurring and dissenting opinions from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gonzales v. Raich.14  Part IV will argue that the
dissenting judges were correct in asserting that the purely local,
noncommercial cultivation of marijuana for personal use as defined by
state law is a class of activities beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause. 15 Part V will evaluate the impact of Raich on future Commerce
Clause challenges, as well as on CSA enforcement, and will consider
the future of federalism. 16  This Note will conclude by asserting that
with the majority decision in Raich, and the replacement of two
confirmed federalists on the Court, the future of the new federalism is
uncertain. 17
II. BACKGROUND
This Part will provide an overview of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, with a primary focus on the expansion of the federal
commerce power in the New Deal Era, which reached its apogee with
Wickard v. Filburn.18  It will examine the subsequent shift towards a
federalist approach to Commerce Clause cases with the arrival of (then)
Justice Rehnquist. 19 In addition, this Part will furnish a brief history of
drug regulation and outline the pertinent provisions of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) and California's Compassionate Use Act.20
A. The Development of the Commerce Clause
Under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, any powers
not expressly granted to the federal government are reserved to the
states.21 While the Tenth Amendment appears to limit federal power,
13. See infra Part II.C (providing a short history of drug legislation, and detailing pertinent
federal and state legislation).
14. See infra Part IlI.D.1 (discussing the majority opinion in Raich); infra Part lII.D.2
(discussing the concurring opinion in Raich); infra Part II.D.3 (discussing the dissenting
opinions in Raich).
15. See infra Part IV (analyzing the majority's economic and separate class arguments).
16. See infra Part V.A (examining the impact of Raich on medical marijuana users).
17. See infra Part V.B (considering the impact of Raich on the future of federalism).
18. See infra Part II.A (providing a brief outline of Commerce Clause challenges from the first
Supreme Court decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
19. See infra Part H.B (describing modem Commerce Clause challenges since the arrival of
Justice Rehnquist on the bench).
20. See infra Part n.C (providing a short history of drug regulation in America, including
Prohibition).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
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the Commerce Clause of the Constitution expands it and has been used
to authorize the bulk of federal legislation. 22  In the seminal case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall rejected a limited
definition of "commerce" as traffic and, instead, defined it broadly as
"commercial intercourse," sweeping any such activity with an interstate
element into its purview. 23  For most of the nineteenth century,
however, Congress utilized its power under the Commerce Clause in a
predominantly negative fashion, as a means of restricting state
activity.
24
1. The Rise of the Commerce Power-The Early Years
The transition of the commerce power from a "dormant" or
"negative" power into an affirmative legislative power was not direct,
despite Justice Marshall's generous interpretation in Gibbons. The
affirmative legislative power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
came into question in the late nineteenth century after passage of the
Interstate Commerce Act26 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,2_ both of
22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 807-08 (3d ed. 1999) ("The
Commerce Clause is both the chief source of congressional regulatory power and, implicitly and
more controversially, a limitation on state legislative power."). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3
("The Congress shall have Power To... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
Several states, and with the Indian Tribes.").
23. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824) ("The power to regulate commerce
extends to every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign
nations, and among the several States. It does not stop at the external boundary of a State.").
TRIBE, supra note 22, at 808. Justice Marshall stated that the commerce power, "like all others
vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges
no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196. Justice
John Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1801-1835), was a prominent
Richmond attorney and a member of the Virginia convention that ratified the federal Constitution
in 1788. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 62-63
(Clare Cushman ed., 1993). President Adams appointed Marshall Secretary of State in 1800; he
was made Chief Justice in 1801. Id. at 62.
24. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 808-10 ("Most cases in the early period concerned the validity of
state action arguably conflicting with 'dormant' congressional power over commerce, otherwise
known as the negative or dormant Commerce Clause.").
25. Id.
26. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). Enacted in 1887, the Interstate
Commerce Act created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the first of the powerful
regulatory commissions established by Congress. THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS
AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 17-19 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1973). The ICC was established at a time when the railroads were engaging in
"highly speculative railroad building, irresponsible financial manipulation, destructive
competitive warfare resulting in monopolies, [and] fluctuating and discriminatory rates... " Id
at 17. Although the ICC's name referred to interstate commerce, Schwartz states that "the
commission was, accurately speaking, only an Interstate Railroad Commission, rather than a
commission to regulate interstate commerce in general." Id. at 20. See generally RICHARD D.
STONE, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY
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which conferred broad regulatory powers on Congress. The view taken
by the Court at that time did not always reflect Chief Justice Marshall's
28broad approach. For example, in United States v. E. C. Knight & Co.,
the Court found that Congress lacked authority to regulate
manufacturing, because it was distinct from commerce, despite the fact
that the products of such manufacturing would later enter the stream of
interstate commerce. 29 However, the Court's subsequent holding in the
Shreveport Rate Cases directly contrasted with the Knight decision; in
Shreveport Rate the Court held that congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce extended to any matter with a "close or substantial
relation to interstate traffic" adequate to require federal control.30  The
Court distinguished between direct and indirect effects on interstate
traffic, and this distinction was later often the basis for limitations on
the reach of the Commerce Clause.31 The tension between Shreveport
and Knight was not easily resolved; Shreveport's expansive notion of
the federal commerce power was a far cry from the restrictive holding
of Knight.
32
OF REGULATORY POLICY 1-30 (1991) (describing the "[e]ra of negative regulation," the years
prior to the passage of Interstate Commerce Act and subsequent developments through 1920).
27. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2-4
(2000)). See also Sherman Anti-Trust Act, http://www.encyclopedia.comhtml/S/ShermanA1 .asp
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006):
[O]pposition to the concentration of economic power in large corporations and in
combinations of business concerns led Congress to pass the Sherman Act [in 1890].
The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce,
declared illegal every contract, combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade.
Id.
28. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 810 ("The view of the Commerce Clause developed by the Court
during this period contrasted sharply with the approach of Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v.
Ogden.").
29. United States v. E.C. Knight & Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895). The Court held that the federal
commerce power did not extend to the purchase of sugar refinery stock. Id. Knight is "[p]erhaps
the case most often cited as an illustration of the interpretive technique of categorical
exclusion... " Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 4, at 935.
30. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 351
(1914) (upholding federal legislation setting rates for intrastate routes because they had direct
effect on interstate commerce).
31. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-549 (1935). The Court
held invalid federal regulations governing working conditions of employees in a strictly intrastate
business, holding that any effect on interstate commerce in that case was indirect, and indirect
effects were insufficient to warrant federal interference. Id. Otherwise, the Court noted, "there
would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a
completely centralized government." Id. at 548.
32. See generally PAUL R. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
1937-1970, at 48-52 (1970) ("The revolutionary effect of the Shreveport doctrine was to provide
constitutional sanction for the future expansion of national sovereignty over the American
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In the first decades of the twentieth century, the Court often upheld
Congress's Commerce Clause authority to enact social welfare
legislation, particularly in instances prohibiting pernicious items, such
as lottery tickets and bad eggs, suggesting a shift towards a more
comprehensive interpretation of the Commerce Clause.33 In Hammer v.
Dagenhart, however, the Court held that Congress could not prohibit
interstate commerce in products created by child labor, arguing that
unlike the cases involving harmful commodities, the items being
shipped were themselves harmless. 34  The Court insisted that local
regulation properly governed the manufacture of commercial goods,
even those destined for interstate commerce. 35 The Court's reasoning in
Hammer was extended to cases involving manufacturing; in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., the Court held that Congress could not regulate coal
production, as it was a purely local activity centered on manufacturing
and production, not commerce. 36 Continuing in this vein of restricting
federal power, the Court struck down federal legislation in Carter and
A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp., relying on the direct-indirect distinction
made in the Shreveport Rate Cases.
37
2. The New Deal Era
However, in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the
economy at the expense of state power.").
33. See, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1913) (holding that Congress
could prohibit white slave traffic); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1911)
(finding that Congress could regulate to prevent impure food and drugs); Champion v. Ames (The
Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (upholding Congress's power to prohibit the transport of
lottery tickets from one State to another). But see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277
(1918) (invalidating a federal regulation limiting the interstate sale of goods produced using child
labor). The Court held that the commerce power did not "incidentally include[] the authority to
prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities..." Id. at 270. The Hammer decision appeared
to contradict the holdings of The Lottery Case, Hoke, and Hipolite Egg, and was overruled in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) ("While manufacture is not of itself interstate
commerce the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of
such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the commerce.").
34. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 272.
35. Id. However, in his dissent, Justice Holmes argued: "The Act does not meddle with
anything belonging to the States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic
commerce as they like. But when they seek to send their products across the State line they are
no longer within their rights." Id. at 281 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301 (1936) ("That commodities produced or
manufactured within a state are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does not
render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation under the commerce
clause.").
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between direct and
indirect effects).
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Court effected a significant shift in direction. 38  In Jones & Laughlin,
the Court dispensed with the direct and indirect analysis of the
Shreveport Rate Cases and framed the issue rather as one of degree.
39
The Court reiterated that congressional commerce power exists even in
the case of intrastate activities if there is "a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce" that makes federal control imperative.
40
Shortly after Jones & Laughlin, the Court also overruled Hammer.
4 1
Thus the New Deal era ushered in a series of decisions greatly
expanding the federal commerce power,42 and it was during this period
that the rational basis test and presumption of constitutionality for
economic and social legislation developed.43 For the next sixty years,
38. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). At this time, the nation was in
grip of the Great Depression, and President Roosevelt's attempts to repair the economy under the
New Deal program had been largely thwarted by the Court. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT 231-232 (1993). Roosevelt responded to the Court's adhesion to a
laissez-faire model of government regulatory power by introducing his "Court-packing" plan in
1937, which would have allowed him to appoint six new justices. Id. at 233. See generally
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 47-50 (1991) (arguing that President Roosevelt's "Court-
packing plan" was the impetus for the Court's shift in direction). However, there is evidence that
the Court voted on Jones & Laughlin before the plan was disclosed. JEROME A. BARRON ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (6th ed. 2002).
Schwartz also points out that the Court had also decided to uphold a state-minimum wage law
before the President's announcement, indicating that the shift in attitude was not provoked by the
President's plan. SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 235.
39. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37 ("The question is necessarily one of degree.").
40. Id. (referencing A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 544
(1935)).
41. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (invoking the Necessary and Proper
Clause and stating that Congress's commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end .. "). See U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. ("To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof."). In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819), Chief Justice Marshall gave the Necessary and Proper Clause a broad interpretation: "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch concerned the ability of
Congress to charter a bank, which is not an enumerated power under the Constitution. See
SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, at 45-47. "The Necessary and Proper Clause attaches not only to the
enumerated congressional powers of Article I, § 8, but also to 'all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States .. " TRIBE, supra note 22, at 805.
42. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN 79-86 (2004) (arguing that Roosevelt appointed
liberal Justices deferential to federal power to secure his civil rights agendas).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), stating that:
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
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the Court found almost no outer limits on the commerce power, and
federal legislation was essentially unchecked by the restrictions of
federalism.
44
3. The Height of New Deal Power-Wickard v. Filburn
The Court reached the zenith of Commerce Clause power in Wickard
v. Filburn, when it held that cultivation of wheat for consumption on the
farm upon which it was grown could be regulated under the Commerce
Clause as an activity or part of a class of activities affecting interstate
commerce. 45  In 1942, a farmer named Filburn brought an as-applied
challenge46  to wheat quota regulations promulgated under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA). 47 The purpose of the
AAA was to control wheat prices by preventing surpluses and
shortages; to achieve this goal an annual national allotment of wheat
was set by the Secretary of Agriculture and apportioned to the states,
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.
44. Barnett, supra note 2 ("[T]he New Deal Court replaced the Constitution's textual scheme
of limited federal power with a policy of judicial deference to any claim by Congress to regulate
anything and everything with even a remote connection with the national economy.").
45. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. IH, 127-28 (1942). See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 (1995) (describing Wickard as "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity..."). The Court did not use the "class of activities"
terminology specifically in the case; discussion of activities in a class appeared in Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971). In Perez, the Court held that extortionate credit transactions
could be categorized as a class of activities having an adequately substantial impact on interstate
commerce to be within the reach of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 155-56.
46. Black's Law Dictionary defines an as-applied challenge as "[a] claim that a law or
governmental policy, though constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, usu. because
of a discriminatory effect; a claim that a statute is unconstitutional on the facts of a particular case
or in its application to a particular party." BLACK'S characterizes a facial challenge as "[a] claim
that a statute is unconstitutional on its face-that is, that it always operates unconstitutionally."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (8th ed. 2004). See also Sanjour v. EPA, 56 F.3d 85, 92 n.10
(D.C. Cir. 1995):
The usual distinction between 'as-applied' and 'facial' challenges is that the former
ask only that the reviewing court declare the challenged statute or regulation
unconstitutional on the facts of the particular case; the latter, in contrast, request that
the court go beyond the facts before it to consider whether, given all of the challenged
provision's potential applications, the legislation creates such a risk of curtailing
protected conduct as to be constitutionally unacceptable 'on its face.'
Id. Sanjour involved a "First Amendment challenge to regulations prohibiting EPA employees
from receiving travel expense reimbursement from private sources for unofficial speaking or
writing engagements concerning the subject matter of the employees' work, while permitting
such compensation for officially authorized speech on the same issues." Id. at 87.
47. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113. See generally Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn:
Agriculture, Aggregation and Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STORIES 69 (Michael C. Doff ed., 2004) (providing details of the AAA and the background of
Wickard).
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which in turn authorized acreages for each individual farm.48 The AAA
included within its purview wheat "available for marketing" and wheat
that was fed to livestock that might be sold.49 Under the AAA, Filburn
was entitled to sow 11.1 acres of wheat in 1941.50 However, Filburn
planted twenty-three acres, and maintained that the excess was to be
used solely on his farm.5 1  Therefore, according to Filburn, Congress
could not regulate the surplus wheat under the Commerce Clause.
52
In its holding, the Court observed that, as far back as the Shreveport
Rate Cases, federal regulation of intrastate activities with a "close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic" had been upheld.53 The Court
affirmed Jones & Laughlin's eradication of the distinction between
direct and indirect effects on the market, stating that whatever the nature
of the activity, even if it is local and not considered commerce, it may
be regulated by Congress "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce."54  Turning then to the current state of the wheat
market, the Court explained that consumption of homegrown wheat was
the most variable factor in the national market.55  Justice Jackson,
writing for the Court, contended that while Filburn's activities might be
construed as trivial standing on their own, they could not be deemed as
such when viewed together with comparable actions of others across the
country. 5 6 The aggregate effect of farmers nationwide producing crops
48. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115 ("Within prescribed limits and by prescribed standards the
Secretary of Agriculture is directed to ascertain and proclaim each year a national acreage
allotment for the next crop of wheat, which is then apportioned to the states and their counties,
and is eventually broken up into allotments for individual farms."); Chen, supra note 47, at 83
("Acreage limitations were the Act's primary tool for controlling the supply of federally
subsidized crops. Supply control has always played a crucial role in rationalizing agricultural
regulation.").
49. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-14.
50. Id. at 114.
51. Chen, supra note 47, at 83. "Filbum sold part of his wheat crop, fed part to his cattle and
poultry, ground part into flour for household consumption, and kept the rest as seed for the
following season." Id.
52. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-14. The Court observed that, although the Commerce power had
"great latitude," activities could not be regulated under it unless "part of the product is intended
for interstate commerce or intermingled with the subjects thereof." Id. at 120.
53. Id. at 123 (citing Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases),
234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914)). See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining the substantial
relation test).
54. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the development of the
indirect and direct analysis for a Commerce Clause challenge).
55. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127.
56. Id. at 127-28. Justice Robert H. Jackson was appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Roosevelt in 1941, having previously served as U.S. Attorney General. Robert H.
Jackson as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/theman2-
2-2-4 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Justice Jackson served on the Court until his death in 1954. Id.
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for local use had a substantial impact on interstate commerce, because
homegrown wheat removed the grower from both the supply and
demand sides of the market.57  In this way, intrastate production
competed with wheat in interstate commerce, and thus the class of
activity had a substantial impact on the national market and could be
regulated by Congress.
58
For the next fifty years, the Court interpreted the federal commerce
power broadly, upholding congressional legislation against Commerce
Clause challenges in a variety of contexts, lerhaps most importantly in
sustaining the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9  Increased deference to
congressional findings was an essential component of these holdings.
60
Critics characterize the period as one of largely unfettered federal
power.
6 1
During the October 1945 term, Justice Jackson served as American Chief of Counsel, prosecuting
Nazi leaders before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Id.
57. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128. The complex concepts of supply and demand involve multiple
economic theories, including demand schedule and curve. MARTIN BRONFENBRENNER ET AL.,
MICROECONOMICS 52 (1984). Individual, market and aggregate levels of supply and demand
function differently. Id. While individual demand is an important theoretical concept, "it is
market, or aggregate, demand that determines the revenue as a whole that sellers receive for
various prices." WILLIAM SHER & RUDY PINOLA, MODERN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 161
(1986).
Market demand is the sum of all the individual consumers' demands for a particular
good or service in a certain location. Market supply is the sum of all the individual
firms' supplies of that good or service in the same location. The interaction of market
demand and market supply determines the market price used in buying and selling.
Aggregate demand and aggregate supply, in turn, result from adding up all the money
values of different market demands and market supplies that exist in a nation or
economy.
BRONFENBRENNER, supra note 57, at 53.
58. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. Wickard "completely swept away the old distinction
between production and commerce; manufacturing, mining and agriculture were now considered
to be part of commerce and inseparable from it." BENSON, supra note 32, at 101.
59. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding disruptive
effect on interstate commerce of racial discrimination in intrastate accommodation sufficient to
permit legislation under the Commerce Clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)
(finding intrastate refusals to serve African Americans food that had moved in interstate
commerce imposed sufficient burden on interstate commerce to support exercise of federal
commerce power). In Katzenbach, the Court stated that where Congress had a rational basis for
finding that regulation of intrastate activity was necessary for the furtherance of interstate
commerce, its commerce power was valid. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304.
60. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 814-15. In civil rights legislation cases, and others decided in
this period, "congressional fact-finding stressed that the regulation of local incident of an activity
was necessary to abate a cumulative evil affecting national commerce. The Supreme Court has
without fail given effect to such congressional findings." Id.
61. Judge Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 5
(1995) (describing the Commerce Clause in the 1970's as the "'Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-
feel-like Clause"'). Judge Kozinski was appointed by President Reagan to the Ninth Circuit in
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
B. Justice Rehnquist's New Federalism
In a departure from cases authorizing the enhancement of the
commerce power, in 1976, (then) Justice Rehnquist authored the
Court's opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, which restricted
the right of federal interference in "traditional government functions."
62
In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 Court,
found that certain amendments to the federal Fair Labor and Standards
Act (FLSA) significantly disrupted the states' ability to self-govern. 63
He identified several key areas that were typically administered by state
and local government as traditional government functions, including
health, police, fire prevention, parks, and sanitation.64 Under a theory
of intergovernmental immunity, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
federal wage requirements at issue in the case stood in direct opposition
to the states' power to effect policy decisions and were not authorized
by the commerce power. Justice Rehnquist's "traditional
governmental function" standard was noted in several other cases,66 but
the standard was later deemed "unworkable" in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority.6 7  In Garcia, the Court explicitly
overruled National League of Cities, and returned to a broader view of
the federal commerce power by holding that there could be no rule of
state immunity simply because the function to be regulated was
1985. Cato Unbound, Alex Kozinski, http://www.cato-unbound.org/contributors/alex-kozinski/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006). One commentator described him as "[c]ulturally libertarian while
politically conservative. " Robert S. Boynton, Wise Guy, GEORGE, Dec. 95/Jan. 96 at 254.
62. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (striking down provisions of the
federal Fair Labor and Standards Act as applied to state and municipal employees). "The
National League of Cities decision marked a dramatic resurgence of a Tenth Amendment barrier
to federal power." Virelli & Leibowitz, supra note 4, at 943.
63. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
64. Id. at 851.
65. Id. at 852. In so holding, National League of Cities overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183 (1968) (upholding Fair Labor and Standards Act requirements for state and municipal
employees). "Wirtz exemplified the largely unquestioned prevailing view.., that the rights of
the states provided no judicially-enforceable limits on congressional power." Virelli &
Leibowitz, supra note 4, at 944 n.106. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity holds that
"[w]ithin certain spheres neither the federal government nor the states may intrude on the other."
JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: How THE SUPREME
COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 236 (1999).
66. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286-89 (1981)
(finding valid federal strip mining regulation and detailing the requirements under National
League of Cities to prevail on Tenth Amendment cases); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 240-
44 (1983) (upholding application of the ADEA and finding that federal interference was not
adequate to allow challenge under the National League of Cities standard).
67. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). "We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and
unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial
appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional."' Id.
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traditional.68 Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent was brief but expressed
his confidence that the pendulum would swing back to a narrow
approach to the federal commerce power.69  Ten years later, his
prediction came true when Lopez, in which (now) Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the majority, put limits on the seemingly
unbounded federal commerce power, shocking the legal academy and
sending a warning to Congress.
1. United States v. Lopez
In Lopez, the Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990 as beyond the scope of Congress's commerce power.71  In his
opinion, the Chief Justice urged a return to first principles of
Constitutional interpretation. 72  Justice Rehnquist explained that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate a commercial activity, as it
purported to prevent possession of a firearm within a certain locality;
furthermore, it did not contain any express jurisdictional element
requiring the possession of the gun to be related to interstate
commerce.73  In its analysis, the Court delineated three classes of
activity that Congress may permissibly regulate under the Commerce
Clause: 1) channels of interstate commerce; 2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and commodities and people in interstate
commerce; and 3) activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce.74 The Chief Justice stated that activities falling into the last
68. Id.
69. Id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549, 565 (1995); Alistair E. Newbem, Comment, Good
Cop, Bad Cop: Federal Prosecution of State-Legalized Medical Marijuana Use After United
States v. Lopez, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1575, 1607 (2000) ("Lopez provided an immediate warning
shot, indicating that, however distended the Commerce Clause had become over the years, it still
drew a firm line between the roles of nation and state."); Barnett, supra note 2 ("For the first time
in 60 years, the Court found a federal statute to have exceeded the commerce power of
Congress.").
71. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-647,
104 Stat. 4844) (1990) stated that "it is illegal to possess a firearm at a place that is within 1,000
feet of a school zone .... After Lopez, the pertinent section was amended to read: "It shall be
unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise
affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 U.S.C. § 922(2)(A) (2000).
72. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (emphasizing that "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers.").
73. Id. at 561. An example of an express jurisdictional element might be a requirement that
guns having moved in interstate commerce could be not possessed in a school zone. TRIBE,
supra note 22, at 818 n.45.
74. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. In his analysis Justice Rehnquist cited Perez, Shreveport Rate
Cases, and Jones & Laughlin, among others. Id. See supra Part I.A (discussing Perez,
Shreveport Rate Cases, and Jones & Laughlin).
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category should be analyzed according to whether they were economic
or noneconomic. 75 While economic activities clearly could be regulated
under the Commerce Clause, noneconomic activities must be more
closely scrutinized to determine whether they are subject to federal
power.76 Observing that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was a criminal
statute unconnected with commerce, the Chief Justice noted that it was
not part of a larger scheme governing economic activity. 77 Moreover,
Congress did not include any specific findings illustrating the effect of
gun possession in a school zone on interstate commerce.78  Although
the Government outlined the impact of violent gun crime on the national
economy, the Court found the link between such crimes and interstate
commerce was too attenuated.79
The Chief Justice rejected Justice Breyer's dissenting contention that
the influence of violence on education and learning sufficientl
threatened the national economy to support congressional regulation. °
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that such an interpretation would
permit general federal intervention in education, which has historically
been under the governance of the states. 8 1 Contending that any activity
can be deemed commercial when considered in its generalities, Chief
75. See TRIBE, supra note 22, at 822. Tribe warns against overstating the apparent similarity
between this approach and those of the pre-1937 cases distinguishing production and
manufacturing from commerce. Id. In Lopez the majority was simply differentiating between the
regulation of activity that is economic and that which was not. Id.
76. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62. Young, supra note 4, at 182 ("If some activity seems
noneconomic on the surface.., then the burden is on the federal government to establish a
substantial effect on interstate commerce by very persuasive evidence...").
77. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. Moreover, the Court noted that the statute in question displaced
existing state law; the defendant was initially charged under state law, but state charges were
dropped after federal authorities charged him with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Id.
at 551.
78. Id. at 562-63 (explaining that although congressional findings are not required, they serve
to assist the Court in interpreting legislative intent, particularly in cases where the relation
between the activity and interstate commerce appears so remote that it is not "visible to the naked
eye"). One observer noted, "the main effect of Lopez is very likely to be nothing more than a
renewed congressional interest in loading federal criminal statutes with findings and jurisdictional
'elements'...." H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 651, 651-52 (1995). However, as Morrison illustrated, the addition of congressional
findings would not guarantee the jurisdictional nexus required by the Court. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000). See infra Part Il.B.2 (explaining that the Court rejected the
link between interstate commerce and violence against women as too tenuous).
79. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[We are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate" under the Government's scheme).
80. Id. at 565 (quoting Breyer, J., dissenting, at 623). In his dissent, Justice Breyer maintained
that Congress could have found a rational connection between violent gun crime in school zones
and the national economy. Id. at 623 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
81. Id. at 564-65.
The Federalism Revolution
Justice Rehnquist admitted that no precise formulation governs whether
82an intrastate activity is commercial. However, for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, when one must "pile inference upon inference" to find a
substantial impact on the national economy, the distinction between
interstate and intrastate activity is lost.83 As such, the Lopez Court held
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was beyond Congress's Commerce
power.84 The Court's return to a limited view of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause would continue with United States v.
Morrison.
85
2. United States v. Morrison
After Lopez, the Rehnquist Court continued to restrict the federal
commerce power in United States v. Morrison.86  In Morrison, the
respondents challenged the provision of a federal civil remedy for
victims of gender-based violence in the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) as beyond the scope of the commerce power.87  The
government argued that the statute was valid under the Commerce
Clause because violence against women has substantial impact on
interstate commerce.
88
In Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist developed a four-factor test to
determine whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce:
1) whether the statute in question is a criminal law having any relation
to commerce or economic enterprise; 2) whether the law contains a
"jurisdictional element" that limits its reach; 3) whether there are
specific congressional findings detailing the effect of the regulated
82. Id. at 566-67.
83. Id. at 567.
84. Id. at 567-68.
85. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See generally Christy H. Dral & Jerry J.
Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605 (2000-2001) (positing that the Court has created unworkable
standards in Lopez and Morrison).
86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
87. Id. at 601-02. The statute at issue was 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(3), part of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994. Id. VAWA represented a federal response to gender-
based violence, criminalizing domestic violence against women and providing victims with
federal remedies. DAVID FORD ET AL., U.S. JUST. DEP'T, CONTROLLING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ON THE 1994 VAWA's CRIMINAL JUSTICE IMPACTS 3
(2002).
88. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 ("Congress found that gender-motivated violence affects
interstate commerce 'by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in
employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved in
interstate commerce; ... by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs,
and decreasing the supply of and the demand for interstate products."') (citing H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 103-711 at 385 (1994) and U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1803, 1853 (1994)).
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activity on interstate commerce; and 4) whether the link between the
activity and its effect on interstate commerce is remote." The Court
observed that the statute in question, as in Lopez, concerned criminal
conduct and contained no express jurisdictional element; however, in
contrast to Lopez, the statute in Morrison was supported by specific
congressional findings. 90 While congressional findings often serve as a
mechanism to find a rational basis for congressional conclusions
concerning the impact of an activity on interstate commerce, the Court
rejected the findings in this instance because the connection was too
tenuous.9 1 Affirming Lopez, the Court held that Congress could not
regulate noneconomic activity based on its aggregate effect on interstate92
commerce. Together with Lopez, Morrison was essential in
establishing the Chief Justice's New Federalism.
93
Beginning with National League of Cities in 1976, the Chief Justice
aimed to return traditional arenas of state governance to state control
and pursued that aim persistently throughout his career, culminating
with Lopez and Morrison.94  Some scholars found Chief Justice
Rehnquist's approach to states' rights to be extreme and even
misguided; by contrast others argued that the so-called revolutionary
decisions in Lopez and Morrison were so limited that very little had
changed.95 Generally, however, the "new federalism" or "Federalism
89. Id. at610-12.
90. Id. at 614. Young, supra note 4, at 183 ("[W]hile the absence of [congressional] findings
was fatal in Lopez, their presence is not constitutionally sufficient to validate regulation of
noneconomic activities.").
91. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614. The Chief Justice referred to his statement in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981): "Simply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so." Id. See supra note 66 (describing the Court's holding in Hodel).
92. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. In his dissent, Justice Souter "doubt[ed] that the majority's
view will prove to be enduring law ... this Court, in any event, lacks the institutional capacity to
maintain such a regime for very long." Id. at 645 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93. See Barnett, supra note 2 ("Rehnquist's opinions in Lopez and Morrison were the
keystones of the New Federalism.").
94. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-78 (2005) ("The Rehnquist Court did revolutionize
federalism doctrine. What it didn't do was revolutionize the actual scope of national power.").
95. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 4 (2003) ("[Un fits of judicial activism evocative of the infamous Lochner era, the
Court's majority reaches out to strike down progressive rights-expanding legislation at both the
federal and state levels. Its justifications vary but the Court often invokes the vacillating and
inscrutable requirements of 'federalism,' a word that appears nowhere in the Constitution but that
has often proved handy for negating federal protection of the rights of the people."); TUSHNET,
supra note 94, at 252 ("From 1937 to the Rehnquist Court, federalism meant nothing as a
restriction on Congress's power. The Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution consisted of
replacing that zero with something more than zero. But not much more."). See also Ramesh
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Revolution" of the Rehnquist Court was understood to be the Chief
Justice's legacy to constitutional jurisprudence. 96 Restriction on federal
power was a theme initiated in his National League of Cities decision
and extended through Lopez and Morrison.97  In Raich, the Court
continued to consider this theme in its review of the federal regulation
and criminalization of drug use.
98
C. Drug Regulation
The power of the federal government to control the intrastate
manufacture and possession of drugs is at the heart of the Raich
decision.99 This section of the Note will discuss early regulation of
drugs in America, including Prohibition, and review laws governing the
use of marijuana prior to the passage of the Controlled Substances
Act. 100 It will then outline the major provisions of the CSA.' 1  Finally,
this section will describe California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996
and the responses it prompted on the part of the federal government. 102
1. Early Regulation
The use, manufacture, and distribution of psychotropic substances
have been the subject of great debate in Western societies. 10 3 Attempts
Ponnuru, The End of the Federalism Revolution... If Such a Revolution Had Ever Occurred,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 4, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/ponnuru/ponnuru200506230756.asp ("So is the federalism
revolution over? No: For the revolution to be over it would have had to begin. The truth is that
there never was a federalism revolution...").
96. Richard Brust, Reviewing Rehnquist, A.B.A. J. (May 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/rehnquist.html ("most observers identify federalism...
as [the] hallmark [of the Rehnquist Court].").
97. See supra Part 11.B (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's "New Federalism").
98. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). See generally JUDGE JAMES P. GRAY, WHY
OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF
THE WAR ON DRUGS 231-34 (2001) (observing that the federalization of drug policy has done
little to resolve the problem of drug use in America).
99. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
100. See infra Part II.C. 1 (outlining the early regulation of drugs in American society).
101. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the major provisions of the CSA).
102. See infra Part II.C.3 (outlining California's Compassionate Use Act).
103. DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES OF HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD 166 (2001). While many psychotropic drugs (including rum, tobacco, opium
and sugar) facilitated the imperial agendas of Old World nations, in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the elite that had previously benefited enormously from the commerce of
such drugs did an about-face and began to develop an "international control regime." Id.
Interestingly, Courtwright distinguishes between drugs that were produced and traded by imperial
powers chiefly for their use as drugs, and cannabis, which was utilized primarily as an
agricultural product (hemp). Id. "Cannabis as a drug was an affair of common folk, slaves and
peasants..." Id. at 167.
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to control or prohibit the use of various drugs likewise pervade
American social policy, although efforts to regulate marijuana did not
begin until the twentieth century. 10 4 In the 1800's and early 1900's,
marijuana was recognized in Europe and the U.S. for its therapeutic
properties-indeed, until 1942 the United States Pharmacopeia listed
marijuana as a medical treatment. 1°5 A different drug was the focus of
prohibition movements in the nineteenth century: alcohol. 10 6  By the
end of the nineteenth century, the temperance movement in America
was gathering widespread momentum. 10 7  In 1893, the Anti-Saloon
League was formed with the objective of nation-wide prohibition. 10 8
After intense lobbying, the Eighteenth Amendment was passed by
Congress in 1917, and ratified by the states in 1919.109 Less than
104. John C. McWilliams, The History of Drug Control Policies in the United States,
HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1990). In
1765, George Washington grew marijuana at Mount Vernon to combat toothache pain. Id.
105. H616ne Peters & Gabriel G. Nahas, A Brief History of Four Millenia (B.C. 2000-A.D.
1974), in MARIHUANA AND MEDICINE 4-6 (Gabriel G. Nahas et al. eds., 1999) (documenting the
use of marijuana in nineteenth-century Britain for "rabies, rheumatism, epilepsy and tetanus").
The United States Pharmacopeia was founded in 1820 and is the public authority for reviewing
all prescription and over-the counter drugs; only 217 drugs were listed on the first U.S.
Pharmacopeia, http://www.usp.org/aboutUSP/history.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
106. See generally JACK S. BLOCKER, JR., AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENTS: CYCLES
OF REFORM 1-29 (1989) (explaining the prohibition movement in the United States); Harvey A.
Siegal & James A. Inciardi, A Brief History of Alcohol, in THE AMERICAN DRUG SCENE 40, 44
(James A. Inciardi & Karen McElrath eds., 2d ed. 1988).
107. BLOCKER, supra note 106, at 61 ("In contrast to the 1850's, when only a few hundred
women scattered in several dozen communities attacked liquor outlets, tens of thousands of
women in nearly a thousand towns and cities now enlisted in the new crusade."). See also
Richard F. Hamm, Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: Unintended Consequences of
the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, in UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 164 (2000). Although many states were dry, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as allowing out-of-state liquor to enter dry jurisdictions.
Id. at 167-68. However, by the time of the First World War, "the Country was largely dry."
GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 197 (1995).
108. BLOCKER, supra note 106, at 96. Other groups with comparable goals to the Anti-Saloon
League included the Prohibition Party and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU).
Hamm, supra note 107, at 164. The WCTU still exists today. Woman's Christian Temperance
Union Homepage, http://www.wctu.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2006). The prohibitionists, in an
attempt to avoid the charge that a ban on alcohol was an infringement on personal liberty, aimed
their efforts at the sale of liquor rather than its consumption. ANASTAPLO, supra note 107, at 196.
109. U.S. CONST., amend. XVHI, cl. 1 ("After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or
the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof
for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."); ANASTAPLO, supra note 107, at 196 (stating that
the Eighteenth Amendment was unnecessary because the Commerce Clause provided Congress
adequate power to regulate the sale of alcohol). Ironically, one consequence of the Eighteenth
Amendment was an increase in the use of marijuana. Laura M. Rojas, Comment, California's
Compassionate Use Act and the 'Federal Government's Medical Marijuana Policy: Can
California Physicians Recommend Marijuana to their Patients without Subjecting Themselves to
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fifteen years later, it was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment, the
first and only time an amendment has ever been repealed. 1l0 After the
repeal of Prohibition, regulation of alcohol was once again left to local
government, and various control mechanisms were employed by the
individual states. 1
Federal drug regulation began with the passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act in 1906, which mandated product labeling. 1 12  However the
first comprehensive federal statute regulating drugs was the Harrison
Act, a taxation measure enacted in 1914 that aimed to control cocaine,
opiates and narcotics, while still allowing for the medical use of such
drugs. 113 Failed federal attempts to ban alcohol did not deter Congress
from continuing to develop regulatory schemes to control the use of
drugs. 114  In 1930, Congress created a separate federal Bureau of
Narcotics (Bureau) to curb illegal drug trafficking. 115  Although the
Bureau was initially established to combat cocaine and opium, with the
spread of recreational marijuana use into the Midwest and Northeastern
Sanctions?, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1999).
110. U.S. CONST., amend. XXI, cl. I & 2 ("1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed. 2. The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."); ANASTAPLO, supra note 107, at
203 (explaining that the Twenty-First Amendment was the only Amendment ratified by state
conventions as opposed to state legislatures; repeal was thus considered to be "mandated by the
people directly."). See Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really
Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 98 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) ("The Eighteenth Amendment, it should be said, is nearly
everybody's prime example of a constitutionally dumb idea.").
111. GRAY, supra note 98, at 232; Tribe, supra note 110, at 99 (explaining that the "evident
objective" of the Twenty-First Amendment was to empower the states to regulate the
transportation and importation of liquor into their respective jurisdictions, an objective that
completely contradicted the principles of federalism); Hamm, supra note 107, at 164 ("The
Eighteenth Amendment accelerated the already present trend toward the development of a federal
police presence..."). Hamin also notes that during Prohibition the federal policing system
expanded greatly, including the creation of a new group of federal enforcement officers called
Prohibition Agents. Id. at 176-77.
112. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) (establishing the
Food and Drug Administration and imposing a prescription requirement for certain drugs). See
also THEODORE VALLANCE, PROHIBITION'S SECOND FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A MORE
HUMANE DRUG POLICY 4 (1993).
113. Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (repealed 1970). VALLANCE, supra note 112, at 4-5
("Although written as a taxation measure, the Harrison Act was clearly intended by the
enforcement agencies to prohibit the use of cocaine and narcotic drugs..
114. McWilliams, supra note 104, at 31.
115. Id. at 32; VALLANCE, supra note 112, at 5 ("a crusading anti-drug activist, Harry J.
Anslinger, was named director [of the Bureau].").
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cities, the "evil weed" became one of the Bureau's prime targets,
despite the fact that marijuana was not controlled by any legislation at
this time. l l 6  In 1937, the federal Treasury Department passed the
Marihuana Tax Act, which imposed burdensome registration
requirements for manufacturers, importers, and dealers of marijuana, as
well as for practitioners prescribing the drug for medical purposes.11 7
As under the Harrison Act, medicinal purposes were recognized as
legitimate, although the law imposed a myriad of compliance
requirements; penalties for uses not permitted under the law were very
harsh."' In 1956, Congress passed the Narcotic Control Act, which
made marijuana possession a felony, included mandatory minimum
sentences for first time offenders, and imposed draconian sentences for
others. 1
19
2. The Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, or Controlled Substances Act (CSA or the
Act). 12  The CSA repealed several earlier acts, including the Harrison
Act, the Marihuana Tax Act, and the Narcotic Control Act, in an
attempt to codify existing drug legislation into one cohesive act.12 1
116. McWilliams, supra note 104, at 35. The drug was "considered particularly dangerous
because of its alien (spelled 'Mexican') and un-American origins." James Inciardi, Introduction:
The Evolution of Drug Abuse in America, in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES 8 (James Inciardi ed., 1990) (emphasis in original).
117. Marihuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970);
McWilliams, supra note 104, at 36-37. The Marihuana Tax Act required tax stamps to be affixed
to all marijuana. Id. Many states continue to have marijuana tax stamp legislation on the books.
Marijuana Tax Stamp Laws and Penalties, http://www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=6670
(last visited Apr. 17, 2006). Failure to affix state-issued tax stamps to marijuana may result in
civil fines, criminal liability or both. Id. Of course, most marijuana purchasers do not comply
with the stamp requirement as it identifies them to government agents. Id. Minnesota's law
imposes the harshest penalties for violation of the stamp statute: up to seven years prison time,
$14,000 in fines or both. Id. States with tax stamps requirements include Alabama, Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas
and Utah. Id.
118. Rojas, supra note 109, at 1279-80. During committee hearings, marijuana was described
as "an addictive drug which produces in its users insanity, criminality, and death," and physicians
arguing for the medical use of marijuana were met with hostility. Id. See also McWilliams,
supra note 104, at 38, for a description of the provisions of the 1937 law.
119. The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 567 (repealed 1970) ("[Almending the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act to provide for a more
effective control of narcotic drugs and marihuana, and for other related purposes."). See also
McWilliams, supra note 104, at 43 (detailing the passage and provisions of the NCA).
120. McWilliams, supra note 104, at 43. The CSA is currently codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-
02, 811-14 (2000).
121. D. MUSTO & P. KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL 32-35 (2002)
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Under the Act, controlled substances are organized into five groups, or
Schedules. 122 Schedule I drugs possess no demonstrated medical value
and a high potential for abuse; in addition, there is a "lack of accepted
safety for use of the drug under medical supervision."' 123  Drugs on
Schedules I-V have demonstrated medical use and are ranked in order
according to their addictive properties. 124  Certain narcotics are
classified as Schedule I drugs, including all opium derivatives, such as
heroin. 125 Hallucinogens such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and
peyote are categorized under Schedule J.126 Marijuana is also listed in
Schedule I, and thus has no currently recognized medical use according
to the CSA. 127  The only permitted use of Schedule I drugs under the
[hereinafter MUSTO & KORSMEYER]. Similarly, the federal drug control agencies were merged
into one-the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, which became the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) in 1973. Id.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2000). Controlled substances acts at the state level generally echo the
CSA's division of drugs. A Guide to State Controlled Substances Acts (1988), in HANDBOOK OF
DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES, Appendix E, 349 (James Inciardi ed., 1990).
123. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2000); Jerome Beck and Marsha Rosenbaum, The Scheduling of
MDMA ("Ecstasy"), in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 307-08 (James
Inciardi ed., 1990) [hereinafter Beck & Rosenbaum]. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia set forth five elements that must be satisfied for a drug to have an accepted
medical use in Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994):
a. The drug's chemistry is known and reproducible;
b. There are adequate safety studies;
c. There are adequate and well-controlled studies proving efficacy;
d. The drug is accepted by qualified experts; and
e. The scientific evidence is widely available.
124. Beck & Rosenbaum, supra note 123, at 308.
125. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2000).
126. Id. at § 812(c)(12). The California Supreme Court, in a very limited holding, permitted a
constitutional freedom of religious practice defense asserted by members of the Native American
Church charged with criminal possession of peyote. People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 821-22
(Cal. 1964). 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(l) (2000) allows use of peyote in tradition Native American
religious functions:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the use, possession, or transportation of
peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with
the practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the
United States or any State. No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated against on
the basis of such use, possession or transportation, including, but not limited to, denial
of otherwise applicable benefits under public assistance programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(l) (2000). See also 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2005) (listing all of the Schedule I
substances under the CSA, including peyote); Garrett Epps, The Story of Al Smith: The First
Amendment Meets Grandfather Peyote, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 477, 477 (Michael C.
Doff ed., 2004) for a description of a landmark freedom of religion case involving the use of
peyote in religious services; RASKIN, supra note 95, at 224 (detailing the passage, and subsequent
striking down by the Supreme Court, of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which granted
waivers for religious practices, including peyote use by Native Americans).
127. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (c)(10) (2000). Marijuana is defined as:
[A]II parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof;
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CSA is in connection with Investigational New Drug applications pre-
approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 
128
In its introductory provisions, the Act details the nature of interstate
commerce in controlled substances and the impact of that traffic on the
American people. 129  In particular, the Act states that controlled
the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not
include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake
made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative,
mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted therefrom),
fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of
germination.
21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2000). In 1985, the FDA approved a synthetic form of marijuana called
dronabinol, sold in capsules containing tetrahydrocannaboids (THC) under the brand name
Marinol, for treatment of symptoms stemming from chemotherapy. DRUG POLICY INFO.
CLEARINGHOUSE, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, MARIJUANA FACT SHEET 1, 6
(Feb. 2004), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/pdf/ncj198099.pdf [hereinafter
MARIJUANA FACT SHEET]. In 1992, the FDA approved the use of dronabinol for anorexia arising
from AIDS. Id. at 6. The FDA has also approved nabilone, a substance with chemical properties
similar to marijuana. Id. Both Marinol and nabilone are available by prescription. Id.
128. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 823(f), 829 (2000). The Department of Health and Human Services
has established procedures for obtaining botanical or "research-grade" marijuana through the
National Institute on Drug Abuse. Notice of Denial of Petition, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,038, 20,047
(Apr. 18, 2001). However, after an upsurge in applications, the program was discontinued in
1992; in 1997 only nine patients continued to receive marijuana under the program. LESTER
GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 22-23 (1997).
Research, however, does continue in other countries: "a Saskatchewan study reported that a
cannabis-like substance injected into rats caused new nerve-cell growth in the hippocampus,
suggesting the possibility that marijuana might actually improve certain brain functions .
Marni Jackson, Pass the Weed, Dad, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 7, 2005, at 26, 28.
129. 21 U.S.C. § 801(l)-(6) (2000). The Act provides a general description of its aims as
follows:
(1) Many of the drugs included within this subchapter have a useful and legitimate
medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the
American people.
(2) The illegal importation, manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use
of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and
general welfare of the American people.
(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and
foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the
interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession,
nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because-
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate
commerce,
(B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in
interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and
(C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce
immediately prior to such possession.
(4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling
the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be
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substances possessed and distributed within a state increase interstate
traffic. 130  Moreover, according to the Act, no distinction can be made
between controlled substances produced and distributed intrastate from
those moving in interstate commerce; therefore federal control over
intrastate trafficking in controlled substances is essential to controlling
interstate movement of such substances. 13 1 No specific congressional
findings are included, however, and the Act's assertions are
unaccompanied by any statistics or other supporting documentation.
132
The Act also provides a mechanism for rescheduling substances. 133
There have been ongoing efforts to reschedule marijuana that date back
almost as far as the CSA itself; indeed the National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORM has campaigned for the
rescheduling of marijuana since 1972. 13 In 1972, NORML filed a
differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate.
Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled
substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances
manufactured and distributed intrastate.
(6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is
essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic.
Id.
130. Id. at § 801(3).
131. Id. at § 801(5).
132. Id. at § 801.
133. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2000 & West Supp. 2005). See, e.g., Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F.2d 881,
898 (1 st Cir. 1987) (upholding DEA's scheduling of MDMA ecstasy as a Schedule I drug, despite
researcher's claim that such a Schedule placement would discourage medical research). The Act
specifies eight factors that the Attorney General will consider in determining whether a substance
should be added, transferred or removed from a schedule:
(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse.
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the drug or other substance.
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse.
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health.
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability.
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled
under this subchapter.
21 U.S.C. § 811 (c).
134. About NORML, www.norml.org/index.cfm?Group-ID=3418#questionl (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006) (describing NORML's mission). See also Brief for National Organization for the
Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 1-2
Ashcroft v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2004) (No. 03-1454), 2004 WL 2336547 [hereinafter
NORML brief] (describing NORML's background and efforts at rescheduling marijuana).
Additionally in 1972, the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse "unanimously
recommended that consumption-related offenses involving marijuana be 'decriminalized."'
RICHARD J. BONNIE, MARIJUANA USE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF DECRIMINALIZATION iii (1980).
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petition requesting that marijuana be removed from the CSA, or
transferred to Schedule V; however, the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) refused even to accept NORML's petition for rescheduling until
it was ordered to do so by the United States District Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.1 35 It was not until 1986, after the
petition's third consideration, that the DEA finally held public
hearings. 136 In 1988, after two years of administrative hearings, a DEA
Administrative Law Judge (AU) determined that marijuana had
therapeutic uses and recommended that the drug be rescheduled.
137
However, the DEA refused to implement the AU's recommendation,
and its refusal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. 
138
While NORML's broad aims include new legislation permitting the
use of marijuana for recreational and other purposes, many cannabis
advocates are particularly interested in the therapeutic uses of
marijuana. 139  Despite the current classification of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug with no recognized medical uses, recent medical
studies, including a 1999 report from the National Academy of
Sciences, Institute of Medicine, have recognized potential therapeutic
uses for marijuana. 14  In recent years, marijuana has been reported to
alleviate pain, stimulate appetite in HIV and AIDS patients, and treat
135. Rojas, supra note 109, at 1383-84 (describing the saga of court battles to reclassify
marijuana).
136. Id. See MARIJUANA, MEDICINE & THE LAW (R.C. Randall ed., 1988) (providing direct
testimony of witnesses in the DEA hearings).
137. In re Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Sept. 6, 1988) ("[I]t would be
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious" to deny the substance to those using it for medical
purposes).
138. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Our
review of the record convinces us that the Administrator's findings are supported by substantial
evidence").
139. See, e.g., Lester Grinspoon & James Balakar, Marijuana as Medicine-A Plea for
Reconsideration 273 JAMA June 21 (1995).
140. JANET E. Joy ET AL., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MARUUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING
THE SCIENCE BASE 177 (1999) ("For patients such as those with AIDS or who are undergoing
chemotherapy, and who suffer simultaneously from severe pain, nausea, and appetite loss,
cannabinoid drugs might offer broad-spectrum relief not found in any other single medication").
See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (stating
"legitimate and growing division of informed opinion" exists regarding therapeutic uses of
marijuana). Judge Kozinski also detailed findings from Canadian and British sources. Id. at 641-
42. He noted that the British House of Lords, "a body not known for its wild and crazy views,"
had determined after conducting public hearings that physicians should be permitted to prescribe
medical marijuana. Id. In its brief, NORML includes a lengthy list of health organizations
supporting immediate legal access to medical marijuana. NORML brief, supra note 134, at la-
4a.
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nausea and vomiting resulting from chemotherapy. 141  Although the
FDA has approved two synthetic forms of marijuana, leading opponents
of medical marijuana to argue that the availability of synthetic
marijuana precludes the need for organic marijuana, proponents of
therapeutic marijuana claim that the organic form of the drug is
superior. 14 2 Due to the therapeutic benefits of marijuana, several states
have implemented programs that allow for the use of medical marijuana
in certain circumstances, creating a class of state-authorized medical
marijuana users (SAMMUs). 143 Some federal legislators have also
proposed the reclassification of marijuana as a Schedule II drug. 144
However, notwithstanding the efforts of marijuana advocates and
legislators, the drug remains on Schedule I of the CSA.
145
3. California's Compassionate Use Act of 1996
In addition to the CSA, every state has its own laws governing drug
use and allocates resources for enforcement; indeed, in 1990 state and
local governments prosecuted over 85% of all drug offenses
nationwide. 14 6  In fact, states have consistently regulated drugs
141. Rojas, supra note 109, at 1387 (outlining medical studies describing the effectiveness of
marijuana as a medicine). See infra note 150 (listing the illnesses for which marijuana provides
relief according to California's Compassionate Use Act).
142. See supra note 127 (describing the synthetic varieties of the drug approved by the FDA).
Tiersky explains that organic marijuana has several advantages over synthetic: 1) organic
marijuana is superior where chronically nauseous patients cannot ingest Marinol capsules; 2)
organic marijuana is a more effective appetite stimulant; 3) organic marijuana is cheaper; and 4)
organic marijuana has immediate effects and thus the patient can more easily adjust her intake.
Tiersky, supra note 5, at 575-77. Another drawback of Marinol is that it contains only one
synthetic delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, whereas organic marijuana contains numerous different
cannabinoids. Medical Marijuana ProCon.org, Individual Bio, Gregory T. Carter, M.D.,
http://www.medicalmarijuanaprocon.org/Bioslnd/Carter.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
Different groups of cannabinoids have different therapeutic benefits; the presence of multiple
groups in a treatment is often advantageous. Id.
143. See infra note 151 (listing the legislation of states with SAMMU programs).
144. H.R. 1782, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); H.R. 2592, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001) (proposing the
reclassification of marijuana as a Schedule II drug, and giving states the right to determine
medical marijuana policy). A letter from Representative Newt Gingrich to the Journal of the
American Medical Association stated: "federal agencies continue to prohibit physician-patient
access to marijuana. This outdated federal prohibition is corrupting the intent of state laws ......
Newt Gingrich, Legal Status of Marijuana, 247 JAMA 1563 (1982), reprinted in Tiersky, supra
note 5, at 589.
145. See, e.g., Notice of Denial of Petition, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,047 (2001) (denying petition to
reclassify marijuana because it has no currently accepted medical use in the United States).
146. William J. Bennett, Introduction, OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, STATE
DRUG CONTROL STATUS REPORT 1 (1990) (noting in the introduction that federal drug policy is
aimed at large-scale and international trafficking, rather than the lower level "street dealers" and
users). Bennett, Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy under President George H. Bush,
also acknowledged that "federal laws cannot displace State drug legislation ... [sltate
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alongside the federal government. 147 In an attempt to regulate drugs in
their state, California voters passed Proposition 215 (Prop 215) in
1996.148 Codified as the Compassionate Use Act of 1996, the law
permits both patients and their primary caregivers to possess or cultivate
marijuana for personal medical reasons, and exempts them from
sanction under other provisions of the California criminal code. 14 9 The
Compassionate Use Act specifies several diseases that may be treated
by medical marijuana. 150  Currently at least eleven other states have
enacted legislation similar to the Compassionate Use Act.
15 1
legislatures have the authority to ... define criminal [drug] offenses .... Id. at 1-2.
Commentators have noted the "effort to control drugs appears [in these reports] essentially as a
battle between good and evil." VALLANCE, supra note 112, at 18.
147. Tiersky, supra note 5, at 586-87. State control of drug policy has several advantages
over federal legislation: 1) such policy is inherently a state right; 2) states have greater flexibility
to experiment with policy options; 3) citizens can undertake referenda to ascertain support for
different policies; 4) citizens can move to another state if they vehemently disagree with medical
marijuana policy. Id. at 586-87.
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2005) (providing that "seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical
use is deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician..."). Proposition 215 was
a ballot initiative that passed "overwhelmingly" on November 5, 1996 and became effective at
12:01 a.m. on November 6, 1996. Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at
Federal & State Responses to California's Compassionate Use Act, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 155, 166 (1997). Note that marijuana cannot be prescribed, only recommended, because it is a
Schedule I drug. Tiersky, supra note 5, at 578.
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(c-d) (West 2005).
150. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A). The list is not exclusive but
includes: "cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
11362.5(b)(1)(A).
151. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010-080 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3412.01 (1996); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 329-121 to -128 (2004);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 2383-B(5) (2004); MONT. CODE ANN., tit. 50, Ch. 46, §§ 101-
103; 201-207 (2005); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 38, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453A.010-810 (2003); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-.346 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4472-4474(d) (2004); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51.010-.070 (West 2006). In addition, the Rhode Island state legislature
overrode the governor's veto on January 3, 2006 and enacted the Thomas Slater-Edward Hawkins
Medical Marijuana Act. Katie Zezima, National Briefing, Rhode Island: New Marijuana Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006 at All; see R.I. Gen. Laws. § 21-28.6. Regulations will not be
promulgated until after a public hearing held on February 28, 2006. Rhode Island Dep't of
Health, Notice of Public Hearing (Jan. 20, 2006),
http://www.health.ri.gov/hsr/regulations/proposed/marij-prop.pdf. Rhode Island is the first state
to enact a medical marijuana law since the Supreme Court's holding in Raich. Zezima, supra
note 151. In 1997, legislators amended Arizona's medical marijuana law, which passed by
referendum in 1996; nevertheless, the full text of the law was restored by Proposition 300
(November 1998). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3412.01 (1996). See Dominica Minore Bassett,
Comment, Medical Use and Prescription of Schedule I Drugs in Arizona: Is the Battle Moot?, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 441, 442 (1998) (providing background to the 1996 referendum and subsequent
legislative action). However, because the text of Arizona's law allows prescription of marijuana,
it is arguably not effective until such time as a physician can legally prescribe marijuana, i.e.,
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The federal government responded to the Compassionate Use Act by
threatening to revoke the controlled substances license of any physician
who recommended the use of marijuana. 152  A group of physicians,
patients and non-profit organizations filed for and won a preliminary
injunction against the government in federal court on the theory that this
policy infringed on patients' First Amendment rights. 15 3  The
government appealed, but in Conant v. Walters the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the injunction, preventing federal officers from arresting
physicians for merely discussing medical marijuana with seriously ill
patients. 1
54
In another response to California's passage of Proposition 215, the
United States filed for an injunction to prevent the Oakland Cannabis
Buyers Cooperative from manufacturing and distributing marijuana, and
the case reached the Supreme Court. 155  The Cooperative proceeded
under a medical necessity defense and also claimed that the CSA, as
applied to medical marijuana, exceeded the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause. 116 The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored
until the federal government reclassifies the drug. MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, STATE-BY-
STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: How TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF ARREST, July 2004,
http://www.mpp.org/pdf/sbs-report_2004.pdf. Other state laws require that marijuana be
"recommended" by a doctor, and thus do not run afoul of the CSA. Id.
152. Tiersky, supra note 5, at 579; Bergstrom, supra note 148, at 167. Federal law requires
health professionals entitled to dispense, administer or prescribe controlled substances to register
with the DEA. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Office of Diversion
Control, http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/prog-dscrptlindex.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
See also 21 C.F.R. § 1301.11 (a) (2005) ("Every person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses,
imports, or exports any controlled substance or who proposes to engage in the manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, importation or exportation of any controlled substance shall obtain a
registration unless exempted by law or pursuant to Secs. 1301.22-1301.26").
153. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("The government's
statutory authority to regulate [distribution and possession of drugs by physicians] does not allow
the government to quash protected speech about it."). See George J. Annas, Reefer Madness-
The Federal Response to California's Medical-Marijuana Law, in DRUGS: SHOULD WE
LEGALIZE, DECRIMINALIZE OR DEREGULATE? 120, 123-26 (Jeffrey A. Schaler ed., 1998)
(discussing the prior history of Conant, the rationale of the court, and the Clinton administration's
response to the injunction).
154. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding the federal policy violated
"core First Amendment interests of doctors and patients").
155. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001) (holding
that no medical necessity defense exists to prohibitions on manufacture and distribution of
marijuana established by CSA). The mission of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, a
not-for-profit organization operating in downtown Oakland, "is to provide seriously ill patients
with a safe and reliable source of medical cannabis information and patient support." Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, http://www.rxcbc.org/mission.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
The federal government attempted to close down the club in August 1996, prior to the passage of
Prop 215. Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 487.
156. Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 494. One commentator suggested that medical marijuana
advocates had been slow to pursue the Commerce Clause argument in challenging the CSA
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by Justice Thomas, held that a medical necessity defense could not be
inferred from the CSA. 157 Justice Thomas explicitly declined to reach
the constitutional questions raised by the Cooperative, as the appellate
court did not address them.158 The perceived conflict between state and
federal legislation concerning the use of medical marijuana would not
be resolved until Gonzales v. Raich, and the issue would be framed by
the Court as implicating the reach of federal power under the Commerce
Clause. 159
III. DIscusSION
In granting certiorari in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court
undertook the specific question it had left unanswered in Oakland
Cannabis Buyers Cooperative-whether the Commerce Clause gives
Congress the power to regulate medical marijuana under the CSA-but
also necessarily addressed the issue of recent restrictions on the federal
commerce power. 16  The first section of this Part will outline the
pertinent facts of the case; 161 the second and third sections will review
the decisions of the district and appellate courts, respectively; 162 and the
fourth section will discuss the opinions of the Court.
1 63
A. Facts
On August 15, 2002, federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
because in other debates, many advocates "would object most strenuously to the limitation of the
federal government's power, especially in cases involving individual rights." Newbern, supra
note 70, at 1581.
157. Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 491. See also Tim Warriner, Some Thoughts About
Raich, http://www.warrinerlaw.com/archives/2005/06/some-thoughts-a.html (last visited Apr.
17, 2006) ("While medicinal use is not a defense in federal court, language from Raich may
potentially be used as a basis for sentencing departure.").
158. Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 494 n.7 ("Nor are we passing today on a constitutional
question, such as whether the Controlled Substances Act exceeds Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause."). The Ninth Circuit had previously found the CSA constitutional on the
basis of Congress's Commerce Clause power in a case involving non-medical marijuana
possession. United States v. Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the CSA). In Rodriquez, the defendant pled
guilty before the district court to possession of ninety-nine pounds of marijuana, but on appeal
argued that the CSA was "unconstitutionally vague" because the words "intent to distribute" were
not adequately specified. Id. at 1221. The court found that "possession with intent to deliver or
transfer a controlled substance, either interstate or intrastate, constitutes a federal offense, and
therefore is not unconstitutionally vague." Id.
159. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005).
160. Id.
161. See infra Part IIl.A (discussing the facts of Raich).
162. See infra Part m.B-C (discussing the lower court decisions).
163. See infra Part III.D (discussing the Supreme Court opinions).
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officers arrived at the home of Diane Monson, a seriously ill California
citizen, and after a three-hour standoff, destroyed her six marijuana
plants. 164 Monson, who suffered from a wasting spinal disease that
caused chronic back pain, cultivated and used marijuana to treat her
symptoms under a doctor's recommendation as allowed by California's
Compassionate Use Act of 1996.165 Monson had been using marijuana
for medical purposes for three years after other medicines had failed to
provide relief or had caused insupportable side effects. 16 6 Angel Raich,
another California citizen, also relied on marijuana to treat her severe
medical conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor, seizure
disorder, and chronic pain. 167 Raich's physician testified that not only
were commercially available medicines ineffective, but also that
denying Raich further marijuana treatments could be fatal. 168  The
district court agreed that conventional treatments showed no promise of
alleviating the symptoms suffered by either woman.
169
Together with Raich and two John Doe plaintiffs who grew the drug
for Raich and provided it to her free of charge, Monson filed suit in the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of California on October
9, 2002, requesting declaratory relief and a permanent injunction. 170
Three weeks later, on October 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction. 171  The goal of the plaintiffs' action was to
prevent similar seizures by DEA agents and to secure their continuing
use of marijuana as a medical treatment. 172  In their complaint, the
plaintiffs mounted an as-applied challenge to the CSA as an
"impermissible extension of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce." 173 They also claimed that enforcement of the CSA against
them violated their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the medical necessity doctrine. 
174
164. Raich v. Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
165. Id. at 921. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 1996) (listing a
sample of illnesses, including chronic pain, for which California citizens have a right to obtain
and use marijuana); supra Part II.C.3 (discussing California's Compassionate Use Act).
166. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2003).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d. at 921 ("Traditional medicine has utterly failed these two
women.").
170. Id. at 920-21.
171. Id.at921.
172. Id.
173. Id. See supra note 46 (distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges).
174. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 922. These claims were not considered in the later Supreme
Court decision; only the Commerce Clause issue was granted certiorari. Gonzales v. Raich, 125
S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005). The doctrine of medical necessity stems from the common law concept
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B. The District Court Decision
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 175  The court
reviewed the history of attacks on the CSA in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, finding that the appellate court had rejected challenges in
which the defendants claimed that Congress lacked authority to regulate
possession of marijuana under the Commerce Clause, because mere
possession was not a commercial or interstate activity. 176 Furthermore,
the court noted that the appellate court had held that the CSA remained
valid after the Lopez and Morrison decisions, as it was backed by
adequate and valid congressional findings. 177  In light of Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence reagrding the CSA, the district court stated that it was
bound by precedent to hold that Congress can regulate wholly intrastate
possession of a controlled substance, even for medicinal purposes. 178 In
addition, the court ruled that: 1) the plaintiffs' Tenth Amendment claim
was invalid because Congress has not compelled the states to take any
action; 179 2) no fundamental constitutional right to obtain and use
of a necessity defense, in which an actor commits a proscribed act to avoid harm from the forces
of nature or the "press of circumstances." Robin Isenberg, Medical Necessity As a Defense to
Criminal Liability: United States v. Randall, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 273, 274 (1978). The
medical necessity defense, "fashioned... from basic concepts of criminal justice and new
concepts of a right to health," is a relatively new development. Id. In United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001), Justice Thomas stated that the
provisions of the CSA "leave no doubt that the [medical necessity] defense is unavailable."
175. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 931. To prevail on a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must
demonstrate: 1) "a strong likelihood of success on the merits;" 2) "the balance of irreparable harm
favors [plaintiffs'] case;" and 3) "the public interest favors granting the injunction." Id. at 921
(citing Am. Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983)). The plaintiff may
also win a temporary injunction if he can show a combination of 1) probable success on the
merits and potential irreparable injury, or 2) serious questions going to the merits and a balance of
hardships that strongly favors the plaintiff. Id. (citing Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795
(9th Cir. 1990)).
176. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 924-26. See also, e.g., United States v. Kim, 94 F.3d 1247,
1249-50 (9th Cir. 1996) (denying defendant's contention that regulating possession of a
controlled substance was beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause because it was
not a commercial activity); United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's argument that marijuana plants rooted in the ground do not affect interstate
commerce).
177. United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the CSA
remained valid post-Lopez because it is backed by congressional findings). See United States v.
Rodriquez-Camacho, 468 F.2d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1972) (relying on congressional findings to
uphold the CSA against a challenge claiming that the CSA exceeded Congress's authority).
178. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 926.
179. Id. at 927. The Supreme Court has made a number of decisions that implicate the Tenth
Amendment's limit on the federal govemment's power to control the actions of the states. E.g.,
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149-51 (2000) (holding federal act limiting state's ability to
disclose individuals' personal information to be within congressional power, stating that Congress
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marijuana for medical purposes exists, and thus there was no Ninth
Amendment violation; l °0 and 3) medical necessity is not a defense for
prohibitions contained within the CSA. 18 1  However, while the court
conceded that it was constrained by precedent and, thus, unable to rule
for the plaintiffs, it concluded that "the equitable factors tip in plaintiff's
favor." 182
C. The Ninth Circuit Decision
The appellants filed their appeal in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March 2003.183 In its analysis, the
Ninth Circuit differentiated the class of activities in the appellants' case
from the class of activities in previous cases in which it had upheld the
CSA as constitutional. 184 The court noted that where an entire class of
activities is within the scope of federal power, minor individual
instances cannot be excised from that class as beyond federal regulatory
authority.185 However, the appellate court found that the cultivation
and use of medical marijuana constituted a different class of activities
than marijuana trafficking. 186 As such, the court reasoned that the
intrastate and strictly noncommercial cultivation, distribution and
possession of medical marijuana in accordance with state law could be
considered a separate class of activities.
187
may not "commandeer[] the state legislative process"); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
187-88 (1992) (holding that federal legislation's take-title provision requiring states to regulate in
accordance with Congress was beyond scope of federal power). See also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (holding that state officers could not be forced to conduct
background searches in connection with federal legislation regulating handguns).
180. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 928 (quoting Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455 (10th
Cit. 1980) ("the decision by the patient whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right, but
his selection of a particular treatment, or at least a medication, is within the area of government
interest in protecting public health.") (emphasis in original)).
181. Id. at 929-30. The court relied on the language of the majority in Oakland Cannabis:
"there is no medical necessity exception to the prohibitions at issue, even when the patient is
,seriously ill' and lacks alternative avenues for relief." Id. at 929 (quoting United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 n.7 (2001)). It extrapolated the finding of
no medical defense for manufacturing and distributing to all of the prohibitions in the Act. Raich,
248 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
182. Raich, 248 F. Supp. 2d. at931.
183. Raich, 352 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 2003).,
184. Id. at 1227. See supra notes 176-77 (listing cases in which the Ninth Circuit had
previously found the CSA constitutional).
185. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1226-27 (internal citations omitted).
186. Id. The court distinguished marijuana used for medical purposes from other marijuana,
noting that medical marijuana does not raise the same health issues, does not have the same
implications for the increase of drug abuse, and does not enter the stream of commerce. Id.
187. Id. at 1229. The court also relied heavily on its decision in United States v. McCoy, 323
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003), in which it held that the possession of a photograph that had "not been
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The appellate court framed the issue facing the court as whether
cultivation and use of medical marijuana as a class of activities has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce such that it comes within the
federal government's Commerce Clause power. 18 8  To determine this
issue, the court examined all four of the Morrison factors. 189  In
determining whether the statute regulates commerce or any sort of
economic enterprise, the court first observed that there was simply no
economic or commercial activity because there was no sale, barter,
exchange or distribution. 19 The court then found that the Wickard
aggregation principle did not apply because the regulated activity was
not commercial; it involved none of the essential elements of
commerce, such as sale, exchange or distribution. 19 1 As such, the court
held that, as applied to the facts, the first element of the Morrison test
was not satisfied. 192  The court also found that there was no express
jurisdictional element in the CSA, and thus the second factor weighed in
mailed, shipped, or transported interstate and is not intended for interstate distribution, or for any
economic or commercial use" could not be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1115.
In McCoy, the majority found that the activity was not de minimis but comprised a "substantial
portion" of the regulated conduct, and was also sufficiently distinct to constitute a separate class.
Id. at 1132.
188. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229.
189. Id. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the four-part Morrison test for determining whether
legislation is permissible under the federal commerce power: 1) whether the law at issue is a
"criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise;" 2) whether the statute contains any "express jurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of" cases; 3) whether there are "express congressional findings regarding
the effects upon interstate commerce" of the activity in question; and 4) whether the link between
the activity and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is "attenuated").
190. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229-30. The court relies on Black's Law Dictionary to define
"commerce," as "the exchange of goods and services, esp. on a large scale involving
transportation between cities, states, and nations." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th
ed. 1999)).
191. Id. at 1230 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 595, 611 n.4 (2000)) ("[l]n
every case where we have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in
Wickard... the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character.") (alteration in
original).
192. Id. at 1231. The court observed that in another case concerning medical marijuana, while
medical marijuana use and cultivation had been properly distinguished as a class, the
congressional findings of the CSA were then erroneously applied to that class. Id. at 1231 n.5
(citing County of Santa Cruz v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1208 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). In
Santa Cruz, the plaintiff, a medical marijuana alliance, sought an injunction against the DEA to
prevent the seizure of marijuana from the alliance and its member patients. Santa Cruz, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1195. The Santa Cruz court denied the injunction because it did not find that the
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, including its claim that the CSA was an unlawful
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1209. The appellate court in Raich
explained that the congressional findings dealt with trafficking and distribution; moreover, the
district court failed to consider whether the statute, as applied to the medical marijuana class,
actually regulated any commercial or economic undertaking. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1231 n.5.
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favor of finding the CSA unconstitutional as applied to the
appellants. 193
The court then turned to the third prong of the test-the presence of
congressional findings. 194  The congressional findings included in the
CSA, according to the court, dealt chiefly with trafficking and, as such,
did not apply directly to the cultivation and use of medical marijuana as
a class of activity. 19 5  While the inclusion of the findings in the Act
indicated that Congress considered the impact of intrastate controlled
substance possession on interstate commerce, the court stated that the
findings "are not specific to marijuana, much less intrastate medicinal
use of marijuana. 96 However, the court conceded that the third
Morrison factor was likely satisfied in light of the findings listed in the
Act. 197  The final factor required the court to assess whether the link
between the regulation and the substantial effect on commerce was
attenuated. 198  The court found that it was, satisfying the fourth
factor. 199 In consideration of all four factors, the court held that the
appellants established a strong showing of the likelihood of success on
the merits of their case because, under the Morrison test, cultivation and
use of medical marijuana as a class of activity did not substantially
affect interstate commerce. 20 The appellate court also noted
approvingly the public interest factors discussed in the lower court's
decision and added that the public interest of California voters in the
"viability" of such state legislation supported ruling in favor of the
appellants. 201 The appellate court thus reversed the lower court's
193. Raich,352F.3dat 1231.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1232. See also 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (describing congressional "findings and
declarations" regarding controlled substances). See supra note 129 (listing the congressional
findings in CSA).
196. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1232.
197. Id. However, the court reiterated that "common sense" would dictate that if findings
were included specific to the class at issue, they would vary widely from those relating to drug
trafficking. Id. Moreover, the court recalled the Morrison Court's admonishment that
congressional findings are not dispositive, and that the first and fourth Morrison factors are more
significant than the second and third in conducting the analysis. Id. at 1232-33.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1233. Another Ninth Circuit judge previously observed: "Medical marijuana, when
grown locally for personal consumption, does not have any direct or obvious effect on interstate
commerce." Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted) (holding that mere discussion of therapeutic uses of cannabis between
doctor and patient were insufficient to constitute conspiracy). He continued, "[flederal efforts to
regulate it considerably blur the distinction between what is national and what is local." Id.
200. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1234.
201. Id. at 1234-35. In discussing the public interest component, the court quoted Justice
Brandeis's famous dissent from New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
2006]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
decision, and remanded to the lower court for entry of a preliminary
injunction. 20 2
D. The Supreme Court Decision
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's
decision.20 3 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens found the controlling
jurisprudence clearly established that the CSA was within the scope of
federal power. 204  While Justice Stevens conceded the insufficiency of
the congressional findings denying the therapeutic uses of marijuana, he
held that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the authority to
regulate the intrastate medicinal marijuana market under the Wickard
doctrine of aggregate activities. 2 05  In his concurrence, Justice Scalia
agreed that Congress had the power to regulate the class of activities but
maintained that the authority derived chiefly from the Necessary and
Proper Clause.20 6  Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and
Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority in two dissenting opinions,
arguing that Lopez and Morrison were analogous and that the regulation
of the class was impermissible under the federal commerce power.20 7
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority asserted that Congress has the authority to regulate the
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
202. Raich, 352 F.3d at 1235. The dissenting judge argued that Wickard was controlling
because the conduct of the farmer in Wickard and the conduct of the plaintiff here are essentially
"indistinguishable." Id. at 1238 (Beam, J., dissenting). He also found that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the CSA where it had not, with one minor
exception (the destruction of the six plants), been applied to any of their activities. Id. at 1235-37
(Beam, J., dissenting).
203. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2198, 2215 (2005).
204. Id. at 2201. Justice Stevens later stated that the outcome of Raich was "unwise," but "I
was convinced that the law compelled a result that I would have opposed if I were a legislator."
Linda Greenhouse, Justice Stevens Weighs v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005,
at Al. Justice Stevens added, "I have no hesitation in telling you that I agree with the policy
choice made by the millions of California voters... [but] our duty to uphold the application of
the federal statute was pellucidly clear." Id.
205. Raich, 125 S. Ct at 2201, 2216-18. See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the majority
opinion in Raich). See also supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Wickard doctrine of aggregate
activities).
206. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring). See infra Part IH.D.2 (discussing
Justice scalia's concurring opinion in Raich). See also supra note 41 (discussing the Necessary
and Proper Clause).
207. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2220, 2229. See infra Part Il.D.3 (discussing the dissenting
opinions); supra Parts II.B. 1-2 (discussing Lopez and Morrison).
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intrastate cultivation and use of medical marijuana. 208 After reviewing
California's Compassionate Use Act, as well as the pertinent facts and
procedural history of the case, the Court outlined a brief history of
marijuana regulation. 20 9  Tracing the arc of legislation from the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906210 to the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937211 to
212the CSA,2 the Court noted the congressional findings included in the
CSA concerning the impact of the intrastate drug market on the national
market 2 13 and described the mechanics of the CSA, including its
scheduling and provisions for reclassification. 2 14  Having established
the framework for the case, the Court then turned to the Commerce
Clause.215
a. Applying Wickard
The Court began with an overview of the evolving nature of the
Commerce Clause, and its transition from a remedy for discriminatory
state legislation to an instrument of federal legislative power.216 Over
the course of the last century, jurisprudence established three areas in
which Congress can regulate under its commerce power, which the
Court listed: channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 217 The Court next outlined the power of Congress, set forth
in Wickard, to regulate local activities that form part of an economic
class of activities having a significant impact on interstate markets.
218
The majority noted the similarities between the facts of Wickard and the
instant case: both cases involved the cultivation of a marketable,
fungible commodity for personal use. 2 19  Furthermore, the Court
208. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215.
209. Id. at 2199-2204.
210. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) (establishing the
Food and Drug Administration and imposing a prescription requirement for certain drugs).
211. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (referencing the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937).
212. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-2201. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the CSA).
213. Raich, 125 S. Ct at 2203 n. 20. See supra note 129 (listing the congressional findings of
the CSA).
214. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203-04. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (detailing
the CSA's reclassification process).
215. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2204.
216. Id. at 2205. See supra Part II.A (providing a brief history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
217. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (listing
the three areas of regulation).
218. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2205.
219. Id. at 2206.
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observed that the purposes behind the governing statutes in each
instance were comparable, as both the Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA) and the CSA were designed to control the movement, supply,
and demand of commodities within markets. 22  Although the CSA
regulates both legal and illegal markets,221 the Court posited that the
correspondence between the acts was adequate to extend the rationale of
Wickard to the facts of the instant case, and concluded that Congress
had a rational basis for including locally cultivated marijuana within the
purview of the CSA.222 In addition, the Court drew a parallel between
homegrown wheat and homegrown marijuana in that both commodities,
while perhaps initially intended for home use, could potentially be
drawn into the interstate market as prices and demand increase. 223 Such
diversion frustrates federal interests, whether that interest is in
controlling the market in wheat or eradicating the one in marijuana. 224
As such, and because the existence of the homegrown commodity has
an impact on supply and demand in the interstate marketplace, Congress
has authority to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.
225
The Court quickly dispatched the Respondents' arguments that
Wickard was not controlling, while allowing that they were "factually
accurate." 226 The Court explained that simply because the AAA did not
regulate all farms, this did not per se diminish Congress's power to
227
regulate Filburn's farm. The Court continued that the production of
220. Id. at 2207.
221. Id. The Court conceded that in contrast to the CSA, which attempts to eliminate demand
for marijuana, the aim of Congress under the Agricultural Adjustment Act is to stabilize and
control the legitimate wheat market. Id. at 2207 n.29. However, prohibition of commerce lies
within Congress's power to regulate, argued the Court, as set forth by Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Lopez. Id. See infra note 231 (discussing concepts of legal and illegal markets).
222. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
223. Id. In contrast, one study suggests that the demand for illegal drugs is not elastic, and
impacts on supply merely impact price. Gary Becker et al., The Economics Theory of Illegal
Goods: The Case of Drugs (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10976, 2004),
available at http://home.uchicago.edu/-gbecker/illegalgoodsBeckerGrossmanMurphy.pdf.
224. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
225. Id. See supra note 57 (discussing supply and demand concepts).
226. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. Respondents argued that Wickard should not control for three
main reasons. Id. First, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) allowed exemptions for small
farmers, and the CSA makes no such provision. Id. Second, commercial farming is a
"quintessential economic activity," unlike the activities of Respondents, which involved no
commercial transaction. Id. Third, in Wickard, the impact of the class of activities (aggregate
production of locally cultivated wheat for farm use) was shown to be substantial. Id.
227. Id. Congress was presumably entitled to use its discretion in deciding which farms
contributed to the aggregate class ("That the Secretary of Agriculture elected to exempt even
smaller farms from regulation does not speak to his power to regulate all those whose aggregated
production was significant, nor did that fact play any role in the Court's analysis."). Id. By an
extension of the above argument, the Court implied that the absence of an exemption provision in
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homegrown wheat was not considered a commercial activity for the
Court's purposes in Wickard, although the wheat was grown on a
commercial farm.228 Finally, the Court stated that the congressional
findings included in the CSA were sufficient to demonstrate a nexus
between the national marketplace and local production, similar to the
findings from the Wickard record. 229  As the majority explained,
Congress is not required to make specific findings, and while its
findings must certainly be considered if made, the lack of such findings
has no impact on Congress's power to enact legislation. 230  In a
footnote, the Court observed that not only did Congress include findings
regarding the impact of intrastate drugs on interstate drug markets but
also that it would be impractical to require Congress to make detailed
findings concerning each activity to be regulated.23' In closing its
Wickard analysis, the Court also pointed out that its duty under the
standard of review did not include deciding whether or not the
cumulative actions of persons, such as the Respondents, actually had a
significant impact on the interstate market; the Court needed only to
determine whether there was a "rational basis" for such a belief.23 2 The
the CSA had no bearing on its applicability to the Respondents. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2207-08.
230. Id. The Respondents posited that the CSA was unconstitutional as applied to them where
Congress made no specific findings concerning the cultivation of medical marijuana and its
impact on the interstate market. Id. In support of its statement that findings were unnecessary,
the Court cited United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) ("We agree with the
Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial
burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce."), and Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
154 (1971) ("We do so not to infer that Congress need make particularized findings in order to
legislate.").
231. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208 n.32 ("Such an exacting requirement is not only unprecedented,
it is also impractical."). For an analysis of the drug trade in economic market terms, see
Disrupting the Market: Attacking the Economic Basis of the Drug Trade, in THE PRESIDENT'S
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY 27 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs05/disruptmkt.html [hereinafter
Disrupting the Market]. Although the Court referred briefly to the fact that the marijuana market
is an illegal one, it never considered whether the impact of a locally grown commodity on illegal
markets could differ significantly from such an impact on legal ones. Infra Part IV.A.1. The
nature of supply and demand in illegal markets is treated in Becker, supra note 223. See Timothy
Lynch, Tabula Rasa for Drug Supply, in AFTER PROHIBITION: AN ADULT APPROACH TO DRUG
POLICIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (2000) ("[1]s the Office of National Drug Control Policy
achieving its twin objectives of 'reducing demand' and 'disrupting supply'?"); Peter Reuter,
Setting Priorities: Budget and Program Choices for Drug Control, in THE UNIVERSITY OF
CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM, TOWARD A RATIONAL DRUG POLICY 145 (1994) ("For the last decade,
the federal drug control budget has been heavily weighted towards programs that are classified as
'supply side."').
232. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208. The Court once again cited Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, for the
proposition that the Court is not required to determine if the class of activities actually has a
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Court then concluded that there was indeed such a foundation for
Congress's belief.
233
b. Not Analogous: Lopez and Morrison
The Court proceeded to discuss two key recent Commerce clause
cases: Lopez and Morrison.2 34 The Court first distinguished these cases
from the current challenge because in both Lopez and Morrison the
statute or provision in question was found to be entirely beyond the
federal commerce power. 235  The Court explained that it could not
excise individual instances of a class of activity as trivial if the class as
a whole is properly regulated under the Commerce Clause.236 Turning
to Lopez, the Court contrasted the Gun-Free School Zones Act with the
CSA, explaining that the former is a brief, single-purpose criminal
statute regulating no commercial or economic activity, whereas the
latter is a comprehensive commercially-based piece of legislation that
governs an enormous spectrum of controlled substances, the bulk of
which serve a beneficial purpose to the American public.23 7 The Court
described the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug by
Congress as simply one of the many essential features of the CSA, and
stated that the regulation of intrastate activity ensures that the larger aim
238
of the Act will not be undermined. The holding in Lopez, according
to the Court, had no impact on Congress's power to regulate purely
local marijuana as part of a larger scheme.239
Similarly, the Court argued that in Morrison, the creation of a federal
civil remedy in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) transcended
the bounds of the federal commerce power because it did not regulate
economic or commercial activity. The Court also noted that in
Morrison, as in Lopez, criminal conduct was at issue in the statute under
substantial impact on interstate commerce, but only whether there is a possible "rational basis"
for such a determination. See supra Part lI.B. 1 (discussing Lopez).
233. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
234. Id. See supra Part I.B. 1-2 (discussing Lopez and Morrison).
235. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209. Conversely, in Raich, the Respondents recognized the validity
of the CSA in general but requested the Court to find unconstitutional a particular application of
the statute. Id.
236. Id. (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971)). See supra note 45
(outlining Perez' "class of activities" holding).
237. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. Significantly, in Morrison, Congress included findings that gender-based violent
crimes had a substantial impact on interstate commerce. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
614 (2000). See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Morrison).
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attack.24 1 In opposition to Lopez and Morrison, the Court reiterated that
in the instant case, the activities governed by the legislation in question
were "quintessentially economic." 242  Thus, the Court concluded, its
holdings in these earlier cases did nothing to undermine the
constitutionality of the CSA.
24 3
c. Conclusion: No Separate Class
Lastly, the Court denied that intrastate medical marijuana cultivation
and production constituted a separate class of activities. 244 The Court
conceded that while the distinctions between individuals participating in
such a class and traffickers could allow for a separate, exempt class,
such a characterization of the issue missed the mark.245 The Court
explained that the sole question for resolution was whether Congress's
decision not to allow for such an exemption violated the Constitution.
246
According to the Court, Congress determined that a separate class was
not justified in light of the CSA's regulatory aims.24 7 First, the Court
underscored that in classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug,
Congress conclusively ascertained that it has no accepted medical
use.248  While the Court acknowledged the existence of studies
documenting the medicinal value of marijuana, it maintained that the
possibility of rescheduling the drug was irrelevant to the case at
249hand. Moreover, the Court posited, by logical extension, if Congress
had no power to regulate local marijuana production and use for
therapeutic purposes, then it would necessarily have no authority to
regulate any locally cultivated and possessed controlled substance for
250
any use, whether medical or recreational. Clearly, the Court opined,
the quantity of drugs falling into this category would be tremendous and
241. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210.
242. Id. at 2211. The Court defined "economic" according to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966) ("the production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities.").
243. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. Ongoing efforts for over thirty years to reclassify the drug have been unsuccessful.
See supra Part II.C.2 (describing ongoing efforts to reschedule marijuana).
249. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211-12. The Court addressed the potential therapeutic benefits of
marijuana in a footnote. Id. at 2212 n.37 (citing JANET E. JOY ET AL., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 179 (1999); and Conant v. Walters,
309 F.3d 629, 640-43 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)).
250. Id. at 2212.
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would have a substantial impact on interstate markets. 251 Congress was
well within the bounds of its authority in electing not to create an
exemption for intrastate marijuana because it would undermine the
operation of the regulatory scheme as a whole.252 In addition, the Court
observed that under the Supremacy Clause, federal law necessarily
preempts the California statute.
253
The Court then remarked that the exemptions permitted under the
Compassionate Use Act would clearly have a substantial effect on the
marijuana market.254  Several potential misuses of medical marijuana
were suggested by the Court: corrupt doctors making a profit from
prescriptions, other physicians determining that recreational use has
therapeutic benefits, patients failing to terminate their use upon
recovery, and non-patients using the exemptions to serve their own
commercial ends.255 In all of these scenarios, the Court maintained that
marijuana intended for therapeutic purposes is diverted into the market
as a whole, and where not just California but nine other states have such
legislative exceptions, the aggregate effect of medical marijuana on
interstate markets would certainly be substantial.256
In conclusion, the Court recommended that the Respondents pursue
alternative avenues for relief, such-as reclassification of marijuana under
the mechanism included in the CSA or new legislation. 257  The Court
251. Id. The Court observed that marijuana is an "extraordinarily popular substance." Id.
Indeed, cannabis remains the number one illicit drug in North America. Jackson, supra note 128,
at 28.
252. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212-13.
253. Id. The Supremacy Clause "ensure[s] the uniform interpretation of federal law." TRIBE,
supra note 22, at 254-55.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Federal laws "enjoy legal superiority over any conflicting provision of
a state constitution or law." BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 682. The Court cited Wickard, among
others, in support of its Supremacy Clause argument: "[N]o form of state activity can
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce clause to Congress."
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942)).
254. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2212. Under the Compassionate Use Act, citizens can cultivate,
possess, and use marijuana for medicinal purposes. Supra note 148.
255. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2214-15.
256. Id. at 2214. See supra note 151 (listing the eleven other states that currently have medical
marijuana legislation or initiatives: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington).
257. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215. In its brief, NORML observed that efforts to reclassify
marijuana have been ongoing for over thirty years, and have been rejected by the DEA. NORML
brief, supra note 134, at 1-2. Reclassification is apparently not an available alternative under
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held that the regulation of intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, use,
and possession of marijuana was not beyond the scope of federal power
under the Commerce Clause, and therefore vacated the judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 258  The case was remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's holding.
259
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred in the majority judgment, but wrote
separately to outline his more "nuanced" approach to the Commerce
Clause interpretation. 2 6  Justice Scalia began by listing the three
categories of interstate commerce within the scope of the federal
power. 26 1  He then distinguished the first two classes from the last,
asserting that while the former are "self-evident," the latter differs as it
is not an actual component of commerce, and therefore the power to
regulate it must stem from another source. 262 Justice Scalia determined
that the source of this complementary authority was the Necessary and
Proper Clause. 26 3  Indeed, Justice Scalia maintained that the third
category, consisting of activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce, is actually incomplete.2 64  Congress, under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, has the power to regulate any intrastate activity
necessary to effect its regulation of interstate commerce.
265
Justice Scalia established the general framework for the regulation of
intrastate activities critical to effective regulation of interstate
current DEA standards. Id. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
attempts to reclassify marijuana).
258. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215. The Court noted that it would not address the medical
necessity defense or substantive due process claim argued by Respondents because the appellate
court did not reach these theories of relief. Id. In Oakland Cannabis, the Court unanimously held
that there was no implied medical necessity exception to the ban on marijuana under the CSA.
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491 (2001).
259. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215.
260. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
261. Id. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the categories as set forth in
Lopez and derived from Perez: the channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities and
persons or things in interstate commerce, and activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce).
262. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2215-16 (Scalia, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia cited several cases in support of his
proposition, the most recent of which was Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 584-85 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]n intrastate activity 'affecting' interstate
commerce can be reached through the commerce power" by means of the Necessary and Proper
Clause). Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 n.l (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra note 41 (describing the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
264. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
265. Id.
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commerce, listing the intrastate activities at issue in several cases where
266the commerce power was upheld. He then proceeded to outline the
limitation on the regulation of intrastate activity by Congress, looking to
Lopez and Morrison.267 The relationship between the regulated activity
and the regulation itself may not be so attenuated that essentially no
area of activity remains beyond the scope of federal power.
268
However, the power to regulate is broad, and Justice Scalia contended
that regulation of noneconomic activity could indeed come under
federal commerce power if it were critical to the regulation of a larger
economic activity. 2 69  Justice Scalia explained that this power derived
from the Necessary and Proper Clause.
27 0
Justice Scalia then turned his attention to the dissent and asserted that
allowing Congress the power to regulate certain intrastate activities did
not reduce the effectiveness of Lopez and Morrison.271 He discussed
the restraints upon Congress's authority to regulate intrastate commerce
under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 2 72 Positing that such authority
only existed within the framework of a larger interstate regulation, and
could only be exercised if vital to the success of that regulation, Justice
Scalia declared that the power was thus a limited one. 273 He explained
that neither Lopez nor Morrison stood for the proposition that Congress
lacked the ability to regulate intrastate activities, but rather that the
relation between the activity and the regulation must be rational.274 The
266. Id. ("That is why the Court has repeatedly sustained congressional legislation on the
ground that the regulated activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce."). Justice
Scalia then listed several cases where such intrastate activities had been federally legislated
including: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281
(1981) (extending Commerce Clause power to regulate surface coal mining); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (extending Commerce Clause power to prohibit
discrimination by restaurants); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (extending Commerce Clause power to prohibit discrimination by hotels),
267. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring).
268. Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
269. Id. Justice Scalia interpreted the Court's holding in Lopez as allowing that "Congress
may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more
general regulation of interstate commerce." Id. See supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing Lopez).
270. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia explained that the
distinction between the Congress's power to regulate based on the Necessary and Proper Clause
and its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities substantially affecting
interstate commerce is often misunderstood. Id.
271. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia quoted Justice O'Connor's dissent,
which argued that the Raich holding reduced Lopez and Morrison to "nothing more than a
drafting guide." Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 2218-19 (Scalia, J., concurring). See supra note 41 (discussing the Necessary and
Proper Clause).
273. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218-19 (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. Id.
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statute at issue in this case was part of comprehensive legislation
governing commercial transactions, unlike the laws challenged in Lopez
and Morrison.27 5 Finally, federal power in this arena is also limited by
the requirement that it must not violate constitutional principles, such as
state sovereignty.
2 76
Applying this interpretation to the facts of the case, Justice Scalia
explained that one of the goals of Congress under the CSA was to
eradicate the national market for Schedule I drugs. 277  In order to
effectuate this aim, Congress has banned the bulk of activities
concerned with these substances, including manufacture, distribution
and possession. 278 Justice Scalia stated that the issue before the Court
was not the commercial nature of Respondents' activities, because
Congress has authority to regulate any activity in connection with
comprehensive interstate commerce legislation.2 79 Rather, the question
is whether the CSA prohibition on intrastate activity is a rational means
of achieving the purpose of the statute.280 Justice Scalia concluded that
Congress's inclusion of intrastate activities was reasonable where
fungible commodities like marijuana, despite state law controls, easily
enter the interstate market, undercutting the federal government's
efforts to eliminate the Schedule I drug marketplace. 281 He rejected the
Respondents' state sovereignty claim that Congress's action in
regulating intrastate activities allowed under state law was not
"necessary and proper. '' 282 Justice Scalia therefore concluded that the
CSA was constitutionally applied to the Respondents' activities.
283
3. The Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas
dissented to the majority opinion; Justices O'Connor and Thomas
authored separate dissents. 2 84 In Justice O'Connor's dissent, she argued
that the majority's holding could not be reconciled with Lopez and
275. Id. See supra notes 234-43 and accompanying text (describing similar arguments made
in the majority opinion distinguishing Raich from Lopez and Morrison). The majority also
distinguished the challenge in Raich from that of Lopez and Morrison in that the latter cases were
facial rather than applied challenges. See also supra note 46 (discussing as-applied challenges).
276. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2218-19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
277. Id. at 2219.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2220-30 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) and 2230-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Morrison and that it improperly expanded the reach of the federal
commerce power.285  Justice Thomas contended that the concept of
enumerated powers was eviscerated if noncommercial activities
producing goods that had no significant impact on the interstate
marketplace could be regulated under the federal commerce power.286
a. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas both joined in Justice
O'Connor's dissent, except for the last section. Justice O'Connor
began by explaining that restraints on the Commerce Clause are
necessary to prevent "excessive federal encroachment" and maintain
state sovereignty-essential elements in preserving a federalist system
of government. 88 The police power, she argued, has always granted
authority to the states to regulate matters involving the health and
welfare of their citizens. 289 Justice O'Connor then stated that the Court
had failed to protect the authority of the states in holding the CSA
constitutional as applied to a class of activities which may not even be
economic, and for which there was furnished no proof of a significant
effect on interstate commerce. 290  Justice O'Connor stated that the
Court's holding would encourage broad-sweeping statutes; by enacting
comprehensive rather than precise legislation, Congress could ensure its
authority for previously impermissible exercises of federal power, as
under this rule congressional power is much more likely to be found
within a framework of a larger regulatory scheme. 29 1  In addition,
Justice O'Connor contended, the Court's holding could not be
reconciled with Lopez and Morrison.
292
Justice O'Connor reviewed the Court's reasons for striking down
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause in Lopez and argued
that the instant case could not be distinguished from Lopez and
285. See infra Part I.C.3.a (detailing Justice O'Connor's dissent).
286. See infra Part Il.C.3.b (detailing Justice Thomas's dissent).
287. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her final section, which the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas did not join, Justice O'Connor explained that if she lived in California, she would
not have voted for Proposition 215, and if she were a California legislator she would not have
supported the Compassionate Use Act. Id. at 2229 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also referred to the famous
Brandeis quote which posited one of the main values of the federalist system to be that "a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
289. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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Morrison using the same analysis.293 Justice O'Connor argued that, in
holding intrastate medical marijuana cultivation and possession to be
within the reach of the federal commerce power because they cannot
easily be separated from the other activities governed by the CSA, the
majority permitted Congress to extend its Commerce Clause power
essentially without restriction, simply by enacting comprehensive
statutes.29 4 For the dissenters, the Court's rationale reduced Lopez to
"nothing more than a drafting guide," for almost any regulation could
be sanctioned so long as it falls within the framework of a larger
economic regulatory scheme.2 95 Justice O'Connor observed that Lopez
and Morrison were intended to put limits on the encroachments of
federal power, not to encourage it by means of more extensive
legislation.
296
Justice O'Connor acknowledged the inherent difficulty in restricting
analysis for cases involving the commerce power, and explained that
courts must find "objective markers" for limiting such analysis. 29 7 In
the instant case, such markers include the recognition by both state and
federal law that therapeutic uses of drugs differ from other uses and can
be separately regulated, as well as state sovereignty concerns.
298
Taking these markers into consideration, Justice O'Connor stated that
the class of activities engaged in by the Respondents should be limited
to the "personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for
medicinal purposes. ' 299 Justice O'Connor questioned whether such a
class could be characterized as economic, and argued that insufficient
evidence was presented to sustain an argument that the class, taken in
the aggregate, either substantially affects interstate commerce or
undercuts the larger regulatory aims of the CSA.300
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's definition of economic
activity, claiming that the majority's definition included "all of
293. Id. at 2221-22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor identified the four
dispositive factors in Lopez as: 1) the statute involved was a criminal statute and not part of larger
economic legislation; 2) the statute did not provide an "express jurisdictional requirement
establishing its connection to interstate commerce;" 3) no congressional findings were made; and
4) the connection between the activity and the purported impact was too remote. Id. See supra
Part Il.B.1 (discussing Lopez).
294. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2222 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296. Id. See supra Part II.B. 1-2 (discussing Lopez and Morrison).
297. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. Id.
300. Id.
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productive human activity. ' 3° 1 By negating any distinction between a
purely local activity and an interstate activity, the Court conflated two
distinct categories and opened the door to a federal police power.
30 2
Justice O'Connor continued that in Lopez and Morrison, the Court
required a direct relation between the regulated activity and commercial
activity. 303 Moreover, in Lopez, possession was clearly identified as a
noncommercial activity. 30 4 Justice O'Connor also rejected the Court's
holding that Wickard was dispositive, distinguishing it on the existence
of exemptions in the AAA.30 5  The AAA exemption illustrated that
Congress was not attempting to extend its authority to every corner of
local wheat production, and the holding of Wickard did not stand for the
proposition that every production of a commodity is economic and
therefore subject to congressional regulation.30 6
Moreover, Justice O'Connor insisted, even if the intrastate cultivation
of marijuana for personal therapeutic uses is indeed economic, no
evidence was furnished that such conduct had a substantial impact on
interstate commerce.307 Distinguishing this case from Wickard, where
the "actual effects" of the activity were considered in light of hard
evidence submitted, Justice O'Connor posited that Congress's mere
statement that the activity in question had a significant impact on
national markets was inadequate. If congressional statement were all
that was required to prove such an impact, the challenged statute
(VAWA) in Morrison would have been upheld. 30 9  Furthermore,
specific, extensive congressional findings were included in VAWA
detailing the impact of the activity on the national economy, unlike the
CSA's declarations, which were unsupported by any such evidence.
310
Justice O'Connor also noted that the unsubstantiated CSA findings did
not specifically address marijuana.3 11 She concluded that the lack of
301. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995)) ("depending on the level of
generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial") (internal quotations omitted).
302. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
303. Id. According to Justice O'Connor, the language of Lopez indicated that such activity
must "arise out of or [be] connected with a commercial transaction." Id. (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 561).
304. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305. Id. The AAA included exemptions for small farmers. Id. at 2207 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). See supra Part H.A.3 (outlining Wickard).
306. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225-26.
307. Id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
309. Id. See supra Part H.B.2 (discussing Morrison and the Violence Against Women Act).
310. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 2228 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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evidence demonstrating that medical marijuana use poses a serious
threat to federal efforts to control the marijuana trade was fatal to the
government's argument.312 Justice O'Connor therefore maintained that
the states' power to regulate for the welfare of its citizens forbids the
intrusion of the federal commerce power on the intrastate cultivation of
medical marijuana for personal use.3 13
b. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas reasoned that if the Commerce Clause power
extended to marijuana that had never entered the stream of commerce
and had no significant impact on the interstate marketplace, then the
concept of limited and enumerated powers was dead.31  According to
Justice Thomas, the activity being regulated was neither interstate nor
commercial, nor was its regulation necessary to preserve Congress's
control of the interstate drug trade under the CSA.3 15 In maintaining
that the activity in question was not commercial, Justice Thomas
referred to the founding-era usages of the term "commerce," which
were consistently limited to trade or exchange and not simply any
316productive activity. The CSA, under Justice Thomas's analysis, thus
represented an impermissible overextension of the federal commerce
power as applied to purely intrastate noncommercial activity.
317
Justice Thomas addressed the issue of whether the Necessary and
Proper Clause provided Congress with authority for its regulation of318
such a class of activities. Justice Thomas viewed the Necessary and
Proper Clause as not conferring sweeping authority, but necessarily
limiting Congress's actions under it to appropriate, plainly adapted
means to achieve legitimate, constitutional ends. 3 9  Therefore,
contended Justice Thomas, an "obvious, simple and direct relation"
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2229 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Lopez, Justice Thomas argued from an originalist
viewpoint, stating that commerce should be defined as it was at the time of the Founding: "At the
time the original Constitution was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and
bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-
86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). "In its purest form, originalism postulates that a constitution,
amendment, or law is to be understood through what its authors intended and in the context of the
time when it was created." Hamm, supra note 107, at 165.
317. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
318. Id. See supra note 41 (detailing the Necessary and Proper Clause).
319. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2230-31 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas referred to Justice
Marshall's interpretation of how Congress's power under the clause is to be used. McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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must exist between the prohibited intrastate activity and the larger
regulation of interstate commerce. 3
20
Justice Thomas then pointed out that the Respondents had brought an
as-applied rather than a facial challenge to the CSA. 32 1 In an as-applied
challenge, Justice Thomas noted, only the scope of the Respondents'
and other similarly situated individuals' activities was considered, and
the issue was whether a ban on their activities was necessary to the aims
322
of the CSA. Justice Thomas concluded that intrastate growers of
medicinal marijuana formed a distinct class, apart from other intrastate
growers, because the marijuana was not intended for commerce, and
because the class was regulated by the Compassionate Use Act.
323
Furthermore, added Justice Thomas, there was no proof that the state
controls imposed by California had been ineffective in preventing
medical marijuana from entering the national market. 324  Nor was it
evident that allowing medical marijuana use would impede enforcement
of the CSA; the identity card registration system already in place would
provide a simple and effective way to establish who had authority to
cultivate and possess medical marijuana.325  Finally, the government
provided no empirical evidence that medical marijuana would have a
substantial impact on the huge national marijuana market.326
Justice Thomas then expanded his analysis of the substantial effects
requirement, arguing that the Morrison factors are insufficient.
327
Justice Thomas argued that by over-generalizing the class of activities
320. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited his concurrence
in Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing
"jurisdictional hook" requirements for a federal act in the context of Necessary and Proper
Clause). Justice Thomas expressed doubts regarding the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Id.
321. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2231 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
322. Id. Justice Thomas added in a footnote that as Lopez and Morrison involved facial
challenges, the analysis in those cases was necessarily different. Id. at n.3. See also supra note
46 (discussing facial and as-applied challenges).
323. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2232 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2233 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging that the standard established in Morrison be
abandoned). Justice Thomas cited his concurrence from Morrison in which he stated that:
[T]he very notion of a 'substantial effects' test under the Commerce Clause is
inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress'[sic] powers and with this
Court's early Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this rootless and
malleable standard, however circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal
Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.
Id. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
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at issue, defining the class as involving merely intrastate marijuana and
not limiting the class to intrastate medical marijuana, the Morrison
factors are too easily manipulated to expand congressional power.
328
Moreover, by relying on an overbroad definition of "economic," the
Court empowered Congress to "regulate quilting bees, clothes drives
and potluck suppers throughout the 50 states.' 329 Justice Thomas
reminded the Court that the commerce power is just that-authority to
regulate commerce and must not include every conceivable human
endeavor.330 In closing, Justice Thomas attacked the Court's assertion
that as the CSA governed interstate commerce, it was immaterial if
local activity was implicated.331  He stated that purely local activity
may not be regulated under the Commerce Clause, nor is merely
incidental regulation permitted under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.332  Justice Thomas also observed that the Court's refusal to
consider whether a particularized class of activities significantly
affected interstate commerce belied its support for the substantial
impact test.333  Justice Thomas reaffirmed that the federalist system
permits state regulation for the health and welfare of its citizens, and
asserted that the Court's holding in this case disregarded the sovereign
power of the States.
334
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority of Justices in Raich improperly held that the intrastate
cultivation of marijuana for personal, noncommercial purposes was
within the reach of the Commerce Clause. 335  This Part will analyze
how the majority incorrectly applied the Wickard aggregate effects
doctrine, and failed to recognize intrastate, noncommercial personal
marijuana cultivation, possession, and use for purposes closely defined
and tightly controlled under state law as a separate class of activities.
336
328. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the
Morrison factors).
329. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
330. Id. See supra note 316 (noting Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez, which relied on
an originalist interpretation of commerce).
331. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra note 41 (discussing the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
332. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2237.
333. Id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
334. Id.
335. See supra Part IH.D.1 (discussing the majority opinion in Raich).
336. See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (outlining majority's application of Wickard doctrine and
arguing that its economic arguments do not apply because the AAA and CSA have disparate
goals).
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It will argue that the dissenters were correct in maintaining that the
majority's position resulted in an overly expansive interpretation of
federal congressional power and blurred the gains of the Federalism
Revolution.3
37
A. Misapplication and Overexpansion
The Raich Court established that federal regulation of noneconomic
intrastate activities can withstand a Commerce Clause challenge if: 1)
the regulation controlling the intrastate activity is nested within
comprehensive economic regulation governing interstate commerce;
and 2) the intrastate activity undercuts the goals of such regulation. 338
In Lopez, the Court described the rationale relied on in Wickard as the
"most far reaching" application of the Commerce Clause.3 39  The
holding in Raich will certainly now assume that title.
340
Under the Court's holding in Raich, Congress can now regulate any
local, noncommercial production of a commodity for which there is an
interstate market. 341  Moreover, under the rational basis test, the very
existence of the interstate market supports the conclusion that such a
commodity could enter the interstate market. 342  However, such a
conclusion is necessarily based on the assumption that current state
legislation governing local production will fail.3 43  The Court's
reasoning fell short on two primary counts: it incorrectly identified
Wickard as controlling, and it improperly refused to recognize intrastate
noncommercial production of marijuana for certain personal uses
337. See infra Part IV.A.3-4 (concluding that the majority improperly refused to recognize a
separate class and the dissenters correctly found that the CSA as applied exceeded congressional
authority).
338. See supra notes 238 and 252 and accompanying text (describing the Court's rationale in
asserting that if regulation of intrastate activity is required to effect the larger aims of the
regulation, it is permissible).
339. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
340. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that Raich "threaten[ed]
to sweep all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach.").
341. Id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that under Raich, Congress could now
regulate "quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States.").
342. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (discussing whether Congress's "rational basis for concluding
that leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would ... affect price and market
conditions."). See supra notes 232-33 (discussing the rational basis test employed in Raich).
343. See supra note 146 (describing how the bulk of local drug enforcement is effected by the
states). The federal government realized early on that it did not have the resources to police drug
activities in all fifty states, and the first "drug czar," Harry Anslinger, petitioned states to sign the
Uniform State Narcotics Act. See generally GRASS (Sphinx Productions 2000) (detailing the
adoption of the Uniform Narcotics Act at the urging of Anslinger); GRAY, supra note 98, at 24
(detailing the efforts of Anslinger to encourage the passage of the Uniform Narcotics Act by the
states).
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defined by the state as a separate class of activities. 344
1. Wickard Was Not Analogous
The Court improperly expanded Wickard to reach the facts of
Raich.345 Wickard was not analogous for several reasons, the most
important of which centered on Filburn's occupation as a commercial
farmer who grew wheat for commercial distribution, whereas the
Respondents in Raich were completely unconnected to commerce.
346
The Wickard Court distinguished Filburn's cultivation of wheat for
personal use from his commercial wheat farming. 3 47  However, in
finding a rational basis for the conclusion that Filburn's homegrown
wheat could enter interstate markets, his position as a commercial actor
was very relevant.34 8  In Wickard, the homegrown wheat was
indistinguishable from the wheat intended for interstate sale-Filbum
was cultivating both types of wheat on the same farm.3 49 Moreover, no
state regulations controlled the homegrown wheat. The Court in
Raich similarly contended that it was impossible to differentiate
between the two categories of marijuana.351  However, unlike Farmer
Filbum, the Respondents were not commercial actors and state
344. See supra note 222, 244 and accompanying text (describing the majority's finding that
Wickard was controlling and conclusion that intrastate noncommercial production of marijuana
for medical use was not a separate class); supra Part W.A. 1 (arguing the majority's application of
Wickard doctrine was improper because the control of wheat under the AAA is not analogous to
the growth of medical marijuana under the Compassionate Act); Part IV.A.3 (arguing the use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes is a separate class of activities from those controlled under the
CSA). See also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2201 (discussing Wickard and refusing to find a separate
class).
345. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 ("The similarities between this case and Wickard are
striking.").
346. See Chen, supra note 47, at 83.
347. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207.
It has been [Filburn's] practice to raise a small acreage of winter wheat, sown in the
Fall and harvested in the following July; to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to
poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour
for home consumption; and to keep the rest for the following seeding.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 114 (1942).
348. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207. ("In Wickard, we had no difficulty concluding that Congress
had a rational basis for believing that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-consumed
wheat outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial influence on price and market
conditions.").
349. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
350. Id.
351. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206. See supra text accompanying note 219 (referring to marijuana
and wheat as "fungible," or interchangeable, commodities). Congress has previously enacted
regulation that supplied a mechanism for distinguishing legal marijuana from contraband: the
Marihuana Tax Act's tax stamp requirement. See supra note 117 (observing that the Marihuana
Tax Act required tax stamps to be affixed to all marijuana).
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regulations were in place governing their local production of medical
marijuana. 352
2. AAA and CSA: Different Goals
Furthermore, the economic arguments relied on in Wickard do not
apply in the context of personal, noncommercial intrastate marijuana
production, despite the contentions of the Court.3 53  A substantial
impact of locally produced commodities on the national market can
only derive from significant effects on demand, supply or cost.354  In
Wickard, the Court found that the cumulative effect of farmers
nationwide growing their own wheat had the potential to substantially
affect the national wheat market.355  By growing their own wheat,
farmers removed themselves from the demand side of the market.
356
This reduced demand, coupled with Congress's intent under the AAA to
stabilize and control that market, could thwart Congress's efforts to
regulate the market.357  Similarly, state-authorized medical marijuana
users (SAMMUs) cultivating their own marijuana remove themselves
from the demand side of the equation because they are no longer forced
to resort to their local illegal marijuana market, which, to the extent that
it is supplied via interstate commerce, affects the national illegal
marijuana market. 358
However, the effect of homegrown wheat on national wheat markets
in Wickard and the effect of SAMMUs' homegrown marijuana on
national marijuana markets are markedly different. 359  The distinction
stems from the divergent purposes of the AAA and the CSA.3 6 0 The
352. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the pertinent state regulations).
353. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (detailing the Raich majority's conclusion
that Congress had a rational basis for including intrastate medical marijuana within the scope of
the CSA).
354. See supra note 57 (discussing the concept of supply and demand).
355. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207 n.28 (2005) ("Even respondents acknowledge
the existence of an illicit market in marijuana; indeed Raich has personally participated in that
market, and Monson expresses a willingness to do so in the future.").
359. See supra Part II.A.3 (detailing Wickard and the effect of homegrown wheat on national
wheat markets).
360. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 n.29. The Court acknowledged that the CSA aimed to
eliminate the demand for marijuana, but argued that prohibition is within Congress's power to
regulate, citing Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lopez that looked to the Lottery Case, Hoke and
Hipolite Egg. Id. See supra note 33 (describing the Lottery Case, Hoke and Hipolite Egg, all of
which regulated the movement of goods/people in interstate commerce). This misses the point,
because the issue here is how the local activity affects congressional intent.
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goal of the CSA is, in part, to eradicate the illegal interstate market for
marijuana. 361  In a National Office of Drug Control position paper,
market disruption is identified as one of the federal government's chief
strategies in the drug war.36 2 Because the CSA aims to extinguish the
interstate market for illegal marijuana, a reduction in demand arising
from the movement of SAMMUs out of the market would further the
CSA's goals, as a decrease in demand would shrink the market.363 By
contrast, the AAA sought to maintain a steady supply of wheat by
controlling both demand and supply.364  Fluctuations resulting in both
shortages and surpluses came within the purview of the AAA.365
Filburn's activities, when considered in the aggregate, undercut the aims
of the AAA by decreasing demand.366 The differences between the
goals of the CSA and the AAA are significant because the Raich Court
framed the issue as one of congressional intent, relying consistently on
the argument that if local noncommercial activities undercut the goals
of a larger economic regulatory scheme, then regulation of the local
activities is permissible under the Commerce Clause. 367
No rational basis exists for concluding that state-authorized local
production of marijuana for medical purposes would significantly affect
the supply moving in national markets. 368  In accordance with
California's Compassionate Use Act, SAMMUs locally consume the
entire supply of medical marijuana, and the commodity never enters
interstate commerce. 36 9  The argument that state-authorized medical
361. See MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 121, at 60. The CSA was an integral component
of President Nixon's "law and order" platform, and represented the cornerstone of his "War on
Drugs." Id.
362. See Disrupting the Market, supra note 231.
363. See supra note 57 (discussing supply and demand principles).
364. See Chen, supra note 47, at 83-84. "Because excessive production can stretch the gap
between the market price for a commodity and the target price set in a government-sponsored
support program, virtually every price support mechanism is paired with some sort of supply
control." Id.
365. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115 (1942). The AAA "control[led] the volume [of
wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and
the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce." Id.
366. Id. at 128.
367. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209-10 (2000). The Court cited Lopez in
explaining that the CSA, unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was "one of many
'essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activities were regulated."' Id. (internal citations omitted).
368. But see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2208-09 ("We need not determine whether respondents'
activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so concluding.").
369. See Joan Biskupic et al., Patients Who Use Marijuana Fear Worst if Forced to Stop, USA
TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-06-06-marijuana-
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marijuana cultivation affects the supply side of the national marijuana
market necessarily assumes that marijuana grown for personal
noncommercial use enters that market. 37  It also assumes that such
marijuana enters the interstate market in sufficient quantities to have a
substantial effect upon interstate availability and hence prices, and
infers that California state law is ineffective in regulating local use and
production. 37 1 The Court refers to no studies or data in setting forth this
argument, in spite of the fact that a number of states have had medical
marijuana initiatives for several years. 372
3. A Separate Class
The Court also refused to recognize local, noncommercial production
of marijuana for personal medical use as a separate class of activities. 373
Congress included in the CSA a statement that drugs moving in
interstate commerce were indistinguishable from locally produced
drugs, and therefore, the regulation of intrastate production was critical
to the larger regulatory scheme. 374 In accepting this rationale, the Court
stated that Congress had no obligation to create an exception under the
law for the purported class, largely because marijuana is absolutely
prohibited under the CSA, and under the Supremacy Clause, in any
conflict between state and federal law, federal law prevails. 37
However, for intrastate purposes, medical marijuana is recognized
under California law.376 The Court observed that under the dissenters'
argument, any locally cultivated controlled substances would be beyond
coverx.htm (discussing the number of SAMMUs in the state of California-approximately
100,000). In 1994, it was estimated that nine million Americans used marijuana regularly.
Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, Alcohol and Other Drugs-Towards a More Rational and
Consistent Policy, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 537 (1994).
370. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2207 ("The ... concern making it appropriate to include marijuana
grown for home consumption in the CSA is the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate
market will draw such marijuana into that market.").
371. But see supra note 146 (acknowledging that federal law could not supplant local drug
enforcement).
372. See supra note 151 (listing the states in addition to California with medical marijuana
laws or initiatives in place).
373. See supra Part III D.l.c (outlining the Court's rationale in declining to recognize the
cultivation and possession of medical marijuana as a separate class of activities).
374. See supra note 129 (listing CSA statements concerning the effects of intrastate
production of on interstate traffic in controlled substances).
375. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 ("The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any
purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that
the drug has no acceptable medical uses."). See supra note 253 (discussing the Supremacy
Clause).
376. See supra Part Il.C.3 (detailing California's Compassionate Use Act).
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the reach of the federal commerce power. 377 In making this argument,
the Court overlooked one key element of the proposed class: the activity
378must be noncommercial. While a class of activity including all
intrastate noncommercial cultivation would certainly be larger than a
strictly SAMMU class, eliminating commercial growers would keep
major intrastate production out of the class of activity.379
Moreover, while the Court maintained that Congress did not exceed
its authority under the Commerce Clause in declining to include an
exception for SAMMUs' activities in the CSA, it also insisted that
authorizing SAMMUs' activities as a class would have a substantial
impact on the national market because of the diversion of medical
marijuana into the general interstate market.38° The majority explained
that a trivial specific instance cannot be excised if the class in general is
reachable under the Commerce Clause.381 And yet, if the cumulative
impact of intrastate medical marijuana production on interstate
commerce is indeed substantial, as posited by the majority, such
activities cannot be characterized as trivial, and merit review under an
as-applied challenge. 382  As the Ninth Circuit correctly observed,
SAMMUs' activities have no substantial impact on interstate commerce
under the Morrison factors. 383 If SAMMUs' activities are considered as
a separate class, the CSA is invalid as applied.384
377. Raich, 125 S Ct. at 2212.
378. DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 84 (2d ed. 1982). An
individual who creates demand also creates supply, because he supplies money, which then enters
the market place-economists describe this phenomenon as the "veil of money" that has been
thrown over the transaction. Id. See also BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 285 (defining "commerce"
as "[tihe exchange of goods and services, esp. on a large scale involving transportation between
cities, states, and nations").
379. See Biskupic et al., supra note 369 (estimating that roughly 100,000 SAMMUs exist in
the state of California).
380. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213-2215. "Indeed, that the California [medical] exemptions will
have a significant impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana is not
just 'plausible' . . . it is readily apparent." Id. at 2213 (referring to Justice O'Connor's dissent at
2229).
381. Id. at 2209 ("That the regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no
moment. As we have done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that
larger scheme.").
382. See supra note 46 (explaining that under an as-applied challenge, although a law may be
constitutional on its face, it can also be found unconstitutional in its application to a particular set
of facts). In contrast to the facial challenges brought in Lopez and Morrison, in Raich the
Respondents asked the Court to find the CSA unconstitutional as applied to intrastate medical
marijuana. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
383. See supra text accompanying note 200 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit, applying the
four-part Morrison test, found that medical marijuana did not substantially affect interstate
commerce).
384. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 647 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
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4. Inherent States' Rights
In addition, as acknowledged by the DEA, state officials conduct the
vast majority of enforcement at the local level. 385  Also, under
California's law, medical marijuana may not be commercially
distributed.386  By eliminating any potential profit motive and
maintaining criminal penalties for selling marijuana, the movement of
authorized medical marijuana into the interstate stream of commerce is
effectively limited.387  The Court's supply-side argument is flawed
because it implies that state mechanisms are inefficient and federal laws
should thus supplant those of the state.388  The Constitution grants
limited powers to the federal government; replacement of state laws
perceived to be lacking is not a legitimate goal under the Commerce
Clause.
38 9
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor rightly observed that the broad two-
part test created by the Raich Court will encourage Congress to enact
comprehensive rather than precise legislation, and, under this new
standard, Congress can reach almost any purely local, noncommercial
production of a commodity for personal use. 39  While conceding that
identifying classes for consideration in Commerce Clause challenges
would require close analysis, she also insisted that the purely local,
noncommercial production of marijuana for medical purposes should be
(determining that medical marijuana did not satisfy the requirements of the Morrison test for
substantial impact on interstate commerce).
385. Bennett, supra note 146 (recognizing that federal drug legislation cannot supplant state
legislation).
386. See CAL HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2005).
Section 11362.5(d) exempts 'a patient' and 'a patient's primary caregiver' from
prosecution for two specific offenses only: possession of marijuana (§ 11357) and
cultivation of marijuana (§ 11358). It does not preclude prosecution under sections
11359 (possession of marijuana for sale) or 11360(a), which makes it a crime for
anyone to 'sell[],furnish [], administer [], or give [] away' marijuana.
People ex rel. Lungren v. Peron, 70 Cal Rptr. 2d 20, 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis in
original).
387. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2214. The majority argued that allowing intrastate
noncommercial marijuana cultivation would permit unscrupulous individuals to improperly profit
from marijuana, which could have a substantial impact on the national market for marijuana. Id.
However, by this reasoning, every drug for which there is an illegal market or potential for abuse,
such as Valium and Viagra, should be placed on Schedule I. See, e.g., News Release, Pfizer,
Pfizer Launches Campaign Against Sellers of Illegal Generic and Counterfeit Viagra and Senders
of Viagra-Related Spam (Aug. 3, 2004), available at
http://www.pfizer.comlpfizer/are/newsreleases/2004pr/mn_2004-0803.jsp (detailing some of
the illegal activities surrounding Viagra distribution).
388. But see Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2213 n.38 (noting that Prop 215 was passed some thirty-four
years after the CSA).
389. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (citing Lopez).
390. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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deemed a separate class of activity, particularly in light of legislative
acknowledgment that medical and recreational drug use can be
separately regulated. 39 1  The act of cultivating marijuana that is for
therapeutic purposes and that is not sold, bartered or exchanged cannot
be construed as commercial activity.3 92 Otherwise, regulation under the
Commerce Clause threatens to "sweep all of productive human activity
into federal regulatory reach," including "quilting bees, clothes drives,
and potluck suppers.'' 93 The dissent's approach would provide a result
more consistent with earlier decisions restricting federal intrusion into
areas historically governed by the states.
394
V. IMPACT
This Part will consider the impact of the Raich decision in two areas:
the future for SAMMUs, and the future of the Federalism Revolution in
the context of the Roberts Court.
395
A. The Future for SAMMUs
For SAMMUs, Raich may ultimately have limited practical
391. Id. at 2223-24 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
392. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated by Gonzalez v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). See also BLACK'S, supra note 46, at 285 (defining commerce as
"[t]he exchange of goods and services, esp. on a large scale involving transportation between
cities, states, and nations.").
393. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Justice Thomas's opinion in this case appears to be a shift away from his rationale in Oakland
Cannabis, in which the Oakland Cannabis Buyers Club proceeded under the theory of medical
necessity to defend its manufacture and distribution of marijuana. See supra Part Il.C.3
(discussing the federal response to California's Compassionate Use Act). In Oakland Cannabis,
Justice Thomas stated that marijuana had no medical use under the CSA, and could not be
dispensed without violating the law, and moreover because the federal legislature had determined
that marijuana had absolutely no medical benefits, a medical necessity defense could not be
inferred from the statute. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491
(2001). In Raich, Justice Thomas was willing to move beyond the categorical congressional
findings to determine that this limited class of activities stands beyond the reach of federal power.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2238.
394. See TUSHNET, supra note 94, at 255. Tushnet describes the "enclave theory," which
"identiflies] areas where regulation by the states, rather than by national government, is so
important that the national government has to stay out.... The usual candidates are family law,
land use regulation, ordinary criminal law, and elementary and secondary education." Id. See
D.G. Savage, Flip Sides: California Marijuana Law Tests High Court Conservatives'
Commitment to Federalism, 90 A.B.A. J. 14 (Dec. 2004) (questioning whether federalism is "a
principle that decides cases, whether or not you agree with the underlying issue," or merely a
doctrine of convenience). Compare with E.A. Young, Let Homegrowers Be, 62 NAT'L L.J. 23
(2004) (framing Raich as a test to determine whether commitment to federalism will prevail over
conservative policies).
395. See infra Part V.A (discussing the limited practical impact of Raich for SAMMUs); Part
V.B (considering the direction of federalism in the newly-composed Roberts Court).
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impact. 39 6 The Supreme Court has held that state sovereignty precludes
Congress from mandating state participation in federal regulatory
schemes, also known as the "commandeering" doctrine. 397 Specific to
California, the Ninth Circuit posited that under this doctrine the federal
government could not force California to repeal its medical marijuana
law; rather it could only step up its own enforcement. 39  As federal
marijuana prosecutions are rare, the likelihood of such prosecution for
medical marijuana users in states with exemptions for such use is
low. 399  One commentator documented state refusal to cooperate with
federal officials after gun-wielding DEA agents arrested a polio patient
confined to a wheelchair during a raid on a medical marijuana
hospice. 40 0  State officials, including the Attorney General of
California, emphasized the ruling would have very little practical
impact. 40 1  Indeed, despite the Raich holding, other states and
communities continue to consider enacting their own medical marijuana
legislation. 40 2  Commentators observe that Raich's holding does not
invalidate state laws, nor does it require that federal or state authorities
prosecute SAMMUs.
403
396. See Tim Warriner, Bad Spin on Jackson and Raich, June 18, 2005,
http://www.warrinerlaw.com/archives/2005/06/badspin-on.jac.html ("Raich perpetuates a
conflict in the law. Medical users who possess smaller quantities, who are not prosecuted in
federal court, may continue to use marijuana. The media treated the Raich decision as the final
battle over medical pot, which it was not.").
397. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding that states could not
be required to accept ownership of waste or regulate according to instructions of Congress). See
also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) ("the Federal Government may not
compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs").
See supra note 179 (discussing the Tenth Amendment commandeering doctrine).
398. See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002). The concurring opinion,
authored by Judge Kozinski, was handed down prior to the Raich decision. Id. at 629-30. In an
interesting parallel to states' refusals to assist federal enforcement of the ban on medical
marijuana, after the Eighteenth Amendment passed, many states "abdicate[d] their law
enforcement responsibilities" in relation to alcohol laws. Hamm, supra note 107, at 175.
399. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say U.S. May Prohibit the Use of Medical Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2005, at Al.
400. Alex Kreit, Comment, The Future of Medical Marijuana: Should the States Grow their
Own?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1787, 1787-88 (2003).
401. Biskupic et al, supra note 369.
402. Meghan Meyer, Movement for Legalization of Medical Marijuana Pushes On, DAILY
SENTINEL, Oct. 20, 2005 available at
http://www.dailysentinel.conmnews/content/shared/news/nation/stories/10/01020-COXMARIJUA
NA.html (stating that two Michigan cities are also contemplating medical marijuana initiatives).
In addition, on November 7, 2005, Denver, Colorado residents approved 1-100, an initiative
legalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana (less than one ounce). Patrick O'Driscoll,
Denver Votes to Legalize Marijuana Possession, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, available at
http:l/www.usatoday.comnews/nation/2005-11-03-potx.htm.
403. Medical Marijuana Policy Project of Montana, http://montanacares.org/home (last visited
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The majority opinion in Raich suggested that reclassification of
marijuana affords one potential resolution to the medical marijuana
issue.404  Attempts to reclassify marijuana have been a cornerstone of
marijuana reformers' efforts for over three decades. 40 5  If therapeutic
marijuana were moved to a less restrictive schedule, Raich would
become largely irrelevant, because the thrust of the majority's logic in
denying that the cultivation and use of medical marijuana could
constitute its own separate class of activity centered on the fact that, as
marijuana is a Schedule I drug, there could be no legal activity
involving it.406 Although the CSA contains provisions allowing for the
rescheduling of controlled substances, thus far, federal regulators have
been unwilling to accept findings concerning the potential medical uses
for marijuana.40 7
B. The Future of the Federalism Revolution
The Raich decision established that federal regulation of purely local,
noneconomic activity can be sustained under the Commerce Clause if
such regulation is included within comprehensive legislation governing
interstate economic activity, and as long as there is a rational basis for
concluding that the local activity undercuts the interstate activity.
40 8
The test set forth by the Raich Court is a departure from more recent
cases as it grants much greater authority to Congress in the regulation of
intrastate activities. 40 9 Moreover, as noted by Justice O'Connor in her
Apr. 17, 2006). "Because the DEA and other federal agents make only 1% of annual marijuana
arrests, patients in Montana and other medical marijuana states retain a high level of protection."
Id.
404. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215 (2005). See supra note 133 (explaining the
reclassification process under the CSA).
405. NORML brief, supra note 134. The prospect of reclassification seems "quite unlikely,
given the response of John P. Walters, the Bush administration's 'drug czar,' the director of
national drug control policy." Greenhouse, supra note 399. See also supra note 134-38 and
accompanying text (discussing NORML's attempt to reclassify marijuana under the CSA).
406. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 ("The CSA designates marijuana as contraband for any
purpose; in fact, by characterizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress expressly found that
the drug has no acceptable medical uses.") (emphasis in original).
407. See supra note 134-38, 144 and accompanying text (outlining failed attempts at
reclassification by lobby groups and legislators). In 1989, an AU recommended that marijuana
be removed from Schedule I after conducting extensive hearings; the DEA Administrator
declined to follow that recommendation. Id. DEA Administrators have insisted that further
research be done before any petition for reclassification can be approved; however, in a Catch-22,
it is almost impossible to legally obtain marijuana for research purposes. Tiersky, supra note 5, at
590-91. See also Grinspoon v. DEA, 828 F.2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1987) (upholding DEA
Administrator's decision not to follow AL recommendation that MDMA be placed on Schedule
I1).
408. See supra Part IIM.D. 1 (reviewing the majority opinion of Raich).
409. See supra Part I.B. 1-2 (discussing Lopez and Morrison, which limited congressional
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dissent, the Raich holding will certainly promote comprehensive
legislation packages as federal legislators attempt to capitalize on the
broader powers extended under Raich.41°
Renewed deference to congressional findings seems likely after the
Raich decision. 4 1 1  The Lopez Court refused to observe an automatic
nexus between violent gun crimes and interstate commerce simply
412because the government argued such a connection could be found. In
Morrison, the Court rejected the voluminous congressional findings
detailing the impact of gender-motivated violence on interstate
commerce included in the Act.4 13  However, in Raich, the Court
accepted at face value Congress's bare assertion that intrastate drug
production affected interstate drug markets.4 14 It is unclear whether the
Court's failure to question congressional findings in Raich marks a shift
away from Rehnquist's federalist agenda or rather represents current
drug policy.
415
The appointment of both a new Chief Justice and a new associate
Justice compounds the difficulty of forecasting whether Raich indicates
that the pendulum is swinging away from the Federalism Revolution
initiated by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 416 It appears that the new Justices
may follow Chief Justice Rehnquist's vision.417  In contrast, however,
power under the Commerce Clause). With Lopez and Morrison, the Court adopted a more
restrictive interpretation of the federal commerce power. See generally Kreit, supra note 400, at
1802-06 (discussing the trend in Supreme Court decisions over the last decade of limiting federal
congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
410. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221-22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
411. Compare with Powell, supra note 78 (suggesting that the effect of Lopez will be to
encourage the inclusion of congressional findings in proposed legislation).
412. See Newbern, supra note 70, at 1607 (arguing that Lopez "drew a firm line between the
roles of nation and state ... [and] showed that this line could not be automatically crossed by the
magical incantation, 'in interstate commerce."').
413. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599-600 (2000). See supra Part II.B.2
(discussing the Morrison decision).
414. Raich, 125 S. Ct at 2210-13.
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one commentator discussing the majority decision in Raich
characterized it as evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist's federalist
agenda may not survive.4 18  Others concur, arguing that as the
Republican Party's majority is now firmly entrenched, its interest in a
limited federal government has declined. 4 19  Two of the five majority
justices in Lopez and Morrison, and two-thirds of the dissenters in
Raich are no longer on the Court.420  However, Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, who voted with the majority to curb congressional power in
Lopez and Morrison, may well return to the federalist fold.421 For now,
however, the Raich test will remain in effect, with the result that more
federal legislation will withstand Commerce Clause challenges, diluting
the gains of the Federalism Revolution.
422
VI. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor firmly supported
limiting congressional power under the Commerce Clause in line with
federalist principles. However, in Gonzales v. Raich, a majority of the
Court held that Congress can regulate any purely local, non-
commercial, state-controlled activity that comes within the purview of
larger, federal economic legislation, even if the local activity does not
undercut congressional goals. The Raich holding's expansive
interpretation of the Commerce Clause undermined the Rehnquist
suggests that his views on the Commerce Clause may be in line with the Raich dissenters. In
Rancho Viejo, the petitioners challenged under the Commerce Clause the application of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) in protecting a species of toad that lives only in California.
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Then-Judge Roberts urged
for a rehearing after a three-judge panel decided that the government could enforce the ESA to
protect the toad without violating the Commerce Clause. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160. Judge
Roberts disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the Commerce Clause power: "The panel's
approach in this case leads to the result that regulating the taking of a hapless toad that, for
reasons of its own, lives its entire life in California constitutes regulating 'Commerce ... among
the several States."' Id.
418. Barnett, supra note 2 ("Establishing the New Federalism took enormous effort and
leadership by Rehnquist over many years. Now that legacy is in jeopardy.").
419. Bernstein, supra note 2. It was "no coincidence that Raich was decided when the
Republican Party was no longer paying lip service to a limited federal government .. " Id.
420. See supra note 9 (providing the recent membership changes to the U.S. Supreme Court).
421. See David Bernstein, Originalism in Crisis,
http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_10-30-2005-11_05.shtnl#1130967291 (last visited
Apr. 17, 2006) (blasting Justice Scalia for "faint-hearted originalism" and commenting that
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Court's shift toward federalism and the restriction of congressional
power with the landmark decisions of Lopez and Morrison. The result
of the Raich holding on federal legislation will be twofold:
congressional legislators will introduce more comprehensive legislation,
and that legislation will more easily withstand Commerce Clause
challenges. Whether the Federalism Revolution of former Chief Justice
Rehnquist can survive after Raich will be determined in the coming
terms by the newly composed Roberts Court.
